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Abstract
This thesis has developed appropriate dynamic models to shed more light on how perva-
sive innovation (e.g., equity-for-guarantee swaps) in entrepreneurship/hedge funds could
alleviate the severe financing constraints for entrepreneurs/hedge fund managers who plan
to launch new businesses.
Chapter 2 considers a risk-averse entrepreneur who invests in a project with idiosyn-
cratic risk and takes debt financing via equity-for-guarantee swaps for diversification bene-
fits. In contrast to the literature, we assume the entrepreneur is unable to get a loan from a
bank directly because of the low creditability of the entrepreneur and lack of collateral and
therefore, an innovative financial contract, equity-for-guarantee swaps, is signed among a
bank, an insurer, and the entrepreneur. The new swap not only solves the serious problems
of widespread financing constraints, but also significantly improves the welfare level of the
entrepreneur.
Chapter 3 develops a new financial derivative product called fees-for-guarantee swap
to alleviate financing constraints of ESFs managers as well as mitigate the manager’s risk-
shifting behaviour. Numerical results indicate that the incentive compensation, managerial
ownership and the possibility of fund liquidation significantly mitigate the manager’s risk-
shifting incentive.
In Chapter 4, a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business has been
built to study the consumption and portfolio choice problem for a risk-averse manager who
launches a hedge fund via a seeing vehicle. This vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap, specifies
that a strategic partner (seeder) provides a critical amount of capital in exchange for partici-
pation in the funds revenue. If structured properly this seeding vehicle could lead to Pareto
improvement, as it alleviates the ESFs manager’s financial constraint, helps seeder get high
potential return for good performance and ordinary investors are more willing to invest in
funds backed up by seeding investment.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis has developed appropriate dynamic models to shed more light on how perva-
sive innovation (e.g., equity-for-guarantee swaps and fees-for-seed swaps among others)
in entrepreneurship/hedge funds could alleviate the severe financing constraints for en-
trepreneurs/hedge fund managers who plan to launch new businesses. A fundamental
theme in this thesis is the recognition that markets are generally incomplete with frictions.
This fact is often neglected in the context of real options, mostly for the reason that the
appropriate models which take account of incompleteness are far more complex and math-
ematically more difficult to deal with. However, this thesis has presented a number of ana-
lytically tractable models and identified key effects of market incompleteness on the timing
of investment and hedge fund management.
More specifically, this thesis pays particular attention to market incompleteness or fric-
tions, e.g. financing constraints, and intends to give more insights on how financial innova-
tion could relieve entrepreneurs’(hedge fund managers’) borrowing constraints in terms of
starting a new business. Although equity-for-guarantee swaps and fees-for-seed swap be-
come increasingly popular in practice, few studies has provided a thorough research on this
topic. There is too much unknown in this developing subject: “What role has the financial
innovation played in relaxing financing constraints? How to price the guarantee costs and
seed costs under the arrangements of innovative contracts? Why would all partners (the
entrepreneur, bank and insurer involved in equity-for-guarantee swaps) like to participate
in this innovative scheme? What is the potential and risks for partners who have signed
the contract?”, just to name a few. Therefore, to answer these important questions and shed
more light on this topic is the main goal of this research.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
In Section 1.1, I have provided essential background information about financial inno-
vation both in entrepreneurship and hedge funds as well as the motivation of this research.
Section ?? gives a short description about the primary approaches employed by this thesis.
Finally, the outline of this thesis is provided in Section 1.2.
1.1 Research background and motivation
The 2008 financial crisis has devastating effects on finance accessibility in real investment.
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)’s survey 1 indicates that the inability to borrow exter-
nally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, nearly 90 % of con-
strained companies say that financial constraints restrict their pursuit of attractive projects,
and more than half of these firms are forced to cancel valuable investments during the cri-
sis. Using a data set of over 10,000 UK small- and medium-sized enterprises (henceforth
SME) employers, Lee, Sameen, and Cowling (2015) find that it is harder for innovative firms
to access finance than other firms, which may lead to a long-term drag on the economy.
Using detailed firm-level survey data on twenty-four hundred firms in China, Ayyagari,
Demirg-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2010) find that only a relatively small percentage of firms
(20%) utilize bank loans and most firms in the sample rely on a large informal sector and
alternative financing channels (i.e. financing innovation).
In this section, I will focus on how the financial innovation in practice could relax these
constraints so as to drive long-term growth in entrepreneurship and hedge funds respec-
tively. Financial innovation like equity-for-guarantee swap(fees-for-seed swap) aiming to
alleviate the financing constraints of the entrepreneur (the hedge fund manager) have been
barely studied, thus, research on how these swaps affect firms’ investment plans and finan-
cial policies is immensely important and undoubtedly worthwhile to investigate.
1.1.1 Entrepreneurship innovation
The increasing research interest in SMEs is driven by the recognition that SMEs play a vital
role in promoting economic growth.2 However, due to low credibility and lack of effective
1citeCampello2010 survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly
assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008.
2More discussion about the importance of SMEs finance can be found in Wehinger (2013) and Lee, Sameen,
and Cowling (2015) among others.
1.1. Research background and motivation 3
guarantee, many entrepreneurs, let alone fresh graduates, are unable to get a bank loan
or get other debt financing cheaply. Under such situation, traditional financial theory on
optimal capital structure is not reasonable since the entrepreneur has no other choice beyond
starting her business with her own money only or simply giving up the business.
To alleviate theses borrowing constraints placed on SMEs, some insurers, entrepreneurs
and bankers in China have developed innovative financial contracts like equity-for-guarantee
swap which could benefit all if it is designed properly. equity-for-guarantee swaps is an
agreement between a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the
bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the entrepreneur defaults on the
debt, the insurer will make a compensatory payment to the creditor so that the creditor will
always be paid up-to a certain guarantee level. In return for the guarantee, the firm needs
to allocate a percentage of the firm’s equity to the insurer. This contract was first signed in
2002 in the city of Shenzhen in China and it has become increasingly popular in the country.
The financial theory of public firms is quite different from that of SMEs, as SMEs’ man-
agers are more likely to subject to financing constraints and their investment lack of diversi-
fication.3 These frictions result in incomplete-markets and cause non-separability between
value maximization and consumption smoothing, which invalidates the classic complete-
market valuation analysis widely applied to public firms.
Inspired by empirical evidences, Chapter 2 extends the dynamic incomplete-market
framework of Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) to endogenously model the impacts and in-
teractions of the two frictions on entrepreneurs’ consumption, portfolio, financing and exit,
by introducing equity-for-guarantee swaps. First, our setting improves a generalized model
of capital structure trade-off among borrowing constraints, tax, diversification benefits, and
costs of financial distress. Second, the equity-for-guarantee swap fundamentally raises the
entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity and therefore the entrepreneur optimally issues more
debt and takes higher leverage than that without the equity-for-guarantee swap. Higher
leverage leads to larger tax shields and diversification benefits because the entrepreneur
faces less equity exposure to the project and thus her portfolio (consisting of private equity
and her liquid wealth) is less risky. Third, the entrepreneur with the swap receives more
welfare increments and has more investment opportunities because of being more willing
3See Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Buera (2009) among others.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
to invest. Higher risk-averse entrepreneurs under higher non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk
gain more benefits resulting from the equity-for-guarantee swap.
1.1.2 Hedge fund seeding innovation
There has been a significant increase in both the number of hedge fund seeders and the
amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding since the aftermath of 2008’s market
upheaval. According to HFM-Week research, in November 2011 seeders had approximately
$4.6 billion in available capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
However, there still remains a tremendous shortage of capital for new and early-stage funds
(ESFs). This is mainly because most capital providers or institutional investors increasingly
focus on larger established hedge funds whose assets under management (AUM) are usually
larger than 1 billion and who are considered highly credible. Additionally a larger talent
pool of ESFs managers is now competing for the scarce available seed capital. Worse still,
barriers to entry for ESFs are much higher today than in the period before the 2008 financial
crisis.
Therefore, navigating the terrain to a successful launch of a hedge fund has become
more difficult and the financing constraints faced by ESFs managers nowadays is much
more serious than before. In order to reach the initial AUM target and cover organizational
expenses, more and more ESFs managers are likely to turn to seed investors for early stage
of capital through a seeding vehicle. This is an arrangement to which we refer as fees-for-
seed swap that specifies that a seed investor (or seeder) commonly commits to providing
a remarkable amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an “anchor investor” in a new
fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually the fees that the
ESFs manager generates from the entire pool of assets in the fund.
A thumb rule for fees-for-seed swap ratio states that a seeder can expect about 1% of
revenues for each $1 million of seed capital for seed transactions no larger than $50 million.
However, seed arrangements can vary substantially based on factors such as the experience
of the manager, the alpha record, the amount of seed capital provided, the withdrawal and
lock-up period terms, and the relative negotiating power of each party.
Although the seeding vehicle in practice has, to some extent, solved ESFs managers’ fi-
nancing constraints, there is still a huge gap between the seeding capital demand and supply
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in the hedge fund seeding business. One main reason could be the severe information asym-
metry between seeders and ESFs managers, which has always been the key factor holding
back the development of the hedge fund seeding business, especially in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis. Inspired by small and medium-sized enterprises’experience of over-
coming borrowing constraints in China as discussed in Yang and Zhang (2013), the financ-
ing constraints due to information asymmetry faced by ESFs managers will be largely alle-
viated by introducing the fees-for-guarantee swap supported by a commercial guarantee-
company or an insurer. Therefore, an insurer was firstly introduced in Chapter 3, through
fees-for-guarantee swaps, to solve the problem of information asymmetry by enhancing the
ESFs manager’s credibility. Unlike the traditional credit support scheme, however, ESFs
managers in the new setting have to pay to the guarantee company a certain portion of her
management fees, as guarantee costs instead of regular guarantee fees. Once the hedge fund
is exogenously liquidated by a crisis shock or endogenously by investors, the seeder can still
get compensatory payment from the insurer.
As there is no publicly available data on the historical performance of seeding strategies,
there are only very few simple models in practice focusing on hedge fund seeding return,
volatility and liquidity profile.4 We are unaware, however, of any existing model that both
captures the managerial skill (alpha) and the convex compensation in a hedge fund seeding
business. Capturing these institutional features in a model that is sufficiently tractable to
evaluate the costs of these innovative swaps in hedge fund seeding business is one of the
main contributions of this study. Chapter 3 mainly focuses on the innovation of the hedge
fund seeding business like fees-for-seed and fees-for-guarantee swaps. Moreover, Chapter
3 provides a dynamic framework for valuing the costs of these swaps, as well as modeling
the impact of the so-called high-water mark, managerial ownership and fund liquidation on
ESFs managers’ risk shifting behavior, at the hedge fund seeding stage. Moreover, Chapter
4 provides the first dynamic framework on valuation of the hedge fund seeding business
by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager. One striking finding is
that this seeding vehicle could lead to Pareto improvement, as it alleviates the ESFs man-
ager’s financial constraints, helps seeder get high potential return for good performance and
ordinary investors are more willing to invest in funds backed up by seeding investment.
4Larch Lane Advisors LLC constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows for a seeded fund
featuring an innovative seeding strategy.
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1.2 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is a collection of three independent research papers which represent the follow-
ing three chapters respectively. Chapter 2 considers a risk-averse entrepreneur who invests
in a project with idiosyncratic risk and takes debt financing via equity-for-guarantee swaps
for diversification benefits and it has been published at European Journal of Operational
Research (Wang, Yang, and Zhang 2015a). Chapter 3 develops a new financial derivative
product called fees-for-guarantee swap to alleviate financing constraints of ESFs managers
as well as to mitigate the manager’s risk-shifting behaviour. Chapter 3 has been accepted
bythe Fourth Chinese Capital Markets Conference-The European Journal of Finance,2014,
University of Nottingham Ningbo China. In Chapter 4, a dynamic valuation model of the
hedge fund seeding business has been built to study the consumption and portfolio choice
problem for a risk-averse manager who launches a hedge fund via the fees-for-seed swap,
this chapter has been published at Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Ewald and
Zhang 2016).
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Entrepreneurial Finance with
Equity-for-Guarantee Swap and
Idiosyncratic Risk
Coauthored with Huamao Wang and Zhaojun Yang1
Abstract
We consider a risk-averse entrepreneur who invests in a project with idiosyncratic risk and takes debt
financing for diversification benefits. In contrast to the literature, we assume the entrepreneur is un-
able to get a loan from a bank directly because of the low creditability of the entrepreneur and lack of
collateral and therefore, an innovative financial contract, named equity-for-guarantee swap, is signed
among a bank, an insurer, and the entrepreneur. We build a dynamic incomplete model to investigate
the effects of the swap on the entrepreneur’s consumption, portfolio, financing and exit from the busi-
ness. We find that the new swap leads to higher leverage, which brings more diversification and tax
benefits. The new swap not only solves the serious problems of widespread financing constraints, but
also significantly improves the welfare level of the entrepreneur. The growth of welfare level increases
dramatically with risk-aversion index and the volatility of idiosyncratic risk.
1Dr Huamao Wang is currently Lecturer in Finance at Kent University (UK) and Dr Zhaojun Yang is Associate
Professor in Finance at Southern University of Science and Technology (China)
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2.1 Introduction
Borrowing constraints and lack of diversification are two typical frictions of entrepreneur-
ship (e.g. (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Gentry and Hubbard 2004; Buera 2009) ). These
frictions result in incomplete-markets and cause nonseparability between value maximiza-
tion and consumption smoothing, which invalidates the classic complete-market valuation
analysis widely applied to public firms. Inspired by empirical evidences, we extend the dy-
namic incomplete-market framework of Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) (henceforth CMW)
to endogenously model the impacts and interactions of the two frictions on entrepreneurs’
consumption, portfolio, financing and exit, by introducing an innovative financial product,
called equity-for-guarantee swap.
One of fundamental characteristics of entrepreneurship is lack of diversification. Specif-
ically, the revenue of an entrepreneurial firm (private firm) suffers systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risks. Entrepreneurs can trade risk-free bonds and the diversified market portfolio
to diversify the systematic business risk but not the idiosyncratic risk. Therefore the di-
versification benefit of risky debt is important to entrepreneurs in addition to the standard
trade-off between tax benefits and costs of financial distress, see Heaton and Lucas (2004)
and Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012) among others.
In addition, there are many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and fresh graduates,
who are hungry for money to start a new business. Such investment is generally extremely
high-risk, and to compensate for that risk, the entrepreneur comes with the potential for
high returns. However, due to low credibility and lack of effective guarantee2, many en-
trepreneurs, let alone fresh graduates, are unable to get a bank loan or get other debt financ-
ing cheaply. Under such situation, traditional financial theory on optimal capital structure
is not reasonable since the entrepreneur has no other choice beyond starting her business
with her own money only or simply giving up the business.
To overcome borrowing constraints, some insurers and entrepreneurs in China have de-
veloped equity-for-guarantee swap. This is an agreement between a lender (bank), an in-
surer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the
2OECD (“OECD Economic Surveys: China 2005”) finds that more than 50% of the firms surveyed reported
their lack of collateral as a major barrier to bank borrowing.
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entrepreneur and if the entrepreneur defaults on the debt, the insurer will make a com-
pensatory payment to the creditor so that the creditor will always be paid up-to a certain
guarantee level. In return for the guarantee, the firm needs to allocate a percentage of the
firm’s equity to the insurer. This contract was first signed in 2002 3in the city of Shen-
zhen in China and it has become increasingly popular in the country. Although, equity-
for-guarantee swaps only exists in China, this chapter conducts theoretical research with
focuses on its role in alleviating entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints and leading to pareto
improvement. Therefore, the applications of this research is not limited in China and could
apply to any markets which suffers severe asymmetric information problems.
In Chapter 2, we extend CMW’s model to take into account both idiosyncratic risk and
the equity-for-guarantee swap. Chapter 2 is related to Yang and Zhang (2013), who pro-
vide the first formal study on equity-for-guarantee swap. However, Yang and Zhang (2013)
merely discuss traditional capital structure issues in the classic framework of Leland (1994).
Our model examines this contract in a more general context with idiosyncratic risk and
cash-out option. Although we focus on entrepreneurial firms here, our model can be em-
ployed by public firms with concentrated managerial ownership who want to enhance the
debt capacity and to increase liquid wealth.
The majority of results in CMW are based on the assumption that the entrepreneur has
“deep pockets”, i.e. she can issue debt with the coupon rate being higher than the project’s
revenue since she can inject cash into the firm to pay coupons. However, this assumption is
not feasible for many entrepreneurs, not to mention fresh graduates. Actually, CMW point
out that entrepreneurs may be liquidity-constrained, i.e. no external funds are available to
cover the firm’s debt service, and hence an earlier liquidation will be forced by the creditor.
We argue that the assumption becomes practical thanks to the equity-for-guarantee swap.
In fact, under the swap, the entrepreneur is equivalent to the one who has deep pockets
and the default threshold can be lower than the coupon level because the claim owned by
the creditor is guaranteed by the insurer. In exchange for the guarantee, the entrepreneur
needs to pay the insurer a proportion of equity of the firm. In addition, since the insurer
guarantees the debt, the creditor under the swap does not demand a protective covenant.
3For more information, please go to the Web(Chinese): http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2002-11-
21/0931813745.html
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Following CMW, we consider a risk-averse entrepreneur having access to standard fi-
nancial investment opportunities, see Merton (1971), with a chance to invest in a project. The
objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize her expected lifetime utility over intertemporal
consumption. We choose the exponential utility primarily for analytical tractability. While
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility does not capture wealth effects, it reduces
the dimension, especially for the double-barrier boundary problem, see Henderson (2002),
Miao and Wang (2007), Henderson (2007), Ewald and Yang (2008), and Yang and Yang (2012)
among others. Similar to CMW, our model adapts to any regular utility functions since the
precautionary savings effect which is captured by utility functions with convex marginal
utility is the driving force behind the results.
The entrepreneur pays a lump-sum investment cost (sunk cost) to start a project, which
generates stochastic revenue cash flow with both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. The
entrepreneur acts two roles of a consumer and a firm. As a consumer, she allocates her liquid
wealth between a risk-free asset and a diversified market portfolio as in Merton (1971). As
a firm, she makes investment, budgeting, financing, and exit decisions.
The entrepreneur has a default option and a cash-out option to exit the business. On one
hand, the entrepreneur defaults on the debt and incurs inefficient liquidation when revenue
is sufficiently low. Different to the literature, e.g. CMW, after default has taken place, the
insurer makes a compensatory payment to the lender. On the other hand, the entrepreneur
might repay the debt in full and sell the firm to cash out if the firm performs sufficiently well.
The two options are nontradable American-style options on the illiquid project with endoge-
nous double-threshold policies. These exit options and the equity-for-guarantee swap make
the entrepreneur effectively bear much less risk and help the entrepreneur to achieve diver-
sification benefits. After exiting, the entrepreneur behaves as a household and lives on her
financial wealth only.
The main results of Chapter 2 are as follows. First, our setting improves a generalized
model of capital structure trade-off among borrowing constraints, tax, diversification ben-
efits, and costs of financial distress. Second, the equity-for-guarantee swap fundamentally
raises the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity and therefore the entrepreneur optimally is-
sues more debt and takes higher leverage than that without the equity-for-guarantee swap.
Higher leverage leads to larger tax shields and diversification benefits because the entrepreneur
2.1. Introduction 11
faces less equity exposure to the project and thus her portfolio (consisting of private equity
and her liquid wealth) is less risky. Third, the entrepreneur with the swap receives more
welfare increments and has more investment opportunities because of being more willing
to invest. Higher risk-averse entrepreneurs under higher nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk
gain more benefits resulting from the equity-for-guarantee swap.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3 solves
the model. Section 2.4 discusses the numerical results. Section 2.5 concludes. Appendix A
provide equilibrium valuation of corporate securities.
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2.2 Model setup
2.2.1 Investment Opportunities
We consider an infinitely-lived risk-averse entrepreneur who has an option to invest in a
take-it-or-leave-it project at present time 0, which requires a one-time investment cost I .
All sources of uncertainty arise from two independent standard Brownian motions B and
Z defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P), where F ≡ {Ft : t ≥ 0}
describes the flow of information available to the entrepreneur.
In addition to the project opportunity, the entrepreneur has access to standard financial
investment opportunities, see Merton (1971). Let W denote the entrepreneur’s liquid (fi-
nancial) wealth process. The entrepreneur invests an amount of Πt in a diversified market
portfolio and the remaining amount Wt − Πt in the risk-free asset with a constant interest
rate r at any time t ≥ 0. The return of the diversified market portfolio is denoted byR which
satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, (2.1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants, and η ≡ (µM − r)/σM is the Sharpe ratio of the market
portfolio.
We assume the project generates a stochastic revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0} that follows a
geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dyt
yt
= µydt+ ρσdBt + dZt, y0 given, (2.2)
where µy is the expected growth rate, σ is the total volatility of revenue growth and ρ ∈
[−1, 1] is the correlation coefficient between the project payoff and the return on market
portfolio given by Equation (2.1).
The Brownian motions B and Z provide the sources of market risk (systematic) and
idiosyncratic risk of private business, respectively. A higher absolute value |ρ| of the cor-
relation coefficient implies that the systematic volatility has a larger weight, ceteris paribus.
The parameters ζ ≡ ρσ and  ≡
√
1− ρ2σ are respectively the systematic and idiosyncratic
volatility of revenue growth.
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2.2.2 Entrepreneurial Financing with Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
We assume the entrepreneur runs the project by setting up a limited liability entity, such as
a limited liability company (LLC) or an S corporation, which allows her to face single-layer
taxation for her business income and makes the debt nonrecourse. We follow the simple
tax system in CMW. Entrepreneurial business profits incur taxes at a rate τe. A public firm
is subject to a double taxation which is captured by an effective marginal tax rate τm. In
addition, the capital gains upon cash-out are taxed at a rate τg.
The entrepreneur finances the initial one-time lump-sum cost I via her own funds and
external financing. We assume that the main source of external financing is debt, e.g. bank
loans. Due to the high default probability and relative lack of collateral, it is much more
difficult for the entrepreneurial firm to take debt financing than for a large company. Unlike
CMW who do not consider borrowing constraints, we study the entrepreneur who is con-
strained in borrowing due to protected covenants demanded by the lenders. This financing
constraint is alleviated by introducing the equity-for-guarantee swap supported by a com-
mercial guarantee company or insurer. Unlike the traditional credit hypothecation, though,
the entrepreneurial firm in the new credit guarantee scheme must pay to the guarantee com-
pany a portion (ϕ) of equity as guarantee costs instead of regular guarantee fees.
Under the guarantee, the entrepreneur chooses to issue a interest-only consol with coupon
b and par value F0 = F (y0) at time 0 and remains unchanged until the entrepreneur exits
from the project. The value F (y) of the debt is equal to the equilibrium value of the cash
flow generated by the debt, which is given by4.
F (y) =
b
r
+
(
F0 − b
r
)
q¯(y) + (φ− 1) b
r
q˜(y), (2.3)
After the debt is in place, at any time t ≥ 0, the entrepreneur has three choices: (1) She
runs the firm and receives a fraction (1−ϕ) of cash payments from the firm; (2) She defaults
once the default threshold yd of the revenue process is reached and then the insurer must
make a compensatory payment to the creditor so that the creditor is paid up-to a certain
guarantee level; (3) She cashes out by selling the firm to a diversified buyer at the cash-out
threshold yu, which incurs a fixed transaction cost K. The default timing Td and cash-out
4See computational details at Appendix A
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timing Tu are endogenously determined by the entrepreneur in order to maximize her own
expected total utility under the guarantee contract signed at time 0.
Once the entrepreneur defaults, the debt holders (lenders) take control and liquidate/sell
the firm. Bankruptcy ex post is costly and the bankruptcy loss can be interpreted in different
ways, such as loss from selling real assets, asset fire-sale losses, legal fees, etc. We assume
that κ ≡ 1 − ι is the bankruptcy loss rate, i.e. ι is the recovery rate. Then the remaining
liquidation/sale value of the firm is equal to ιA(yd), where A(yd) is the equilibrium value
of an unlevered (all-equity without debt) public firm given by (A.4). Moreover, the debt
holders will gain the compensatory payment from the guarantee company so that under
the arrangement of equity-for-guarantee contract the debt holders gain φb/r once the en-
trepreneur defaults instead of the remaining value ιA(yd) only, where φ is the guarantee
level. Therefore, the value, denoted by Pguar, of the compensatory payment is given by
Pguar = (
φb
r
− ιA(yd))q˜(y), (2.4)
where q˜(y) is the value of a security that claims one unit of account at the default time. 5
While selling the firm to cash out, the entrepreneur needs to retire the firm’s debt obliga-
tion at par F0 given by Equation( A.18) in Appendix A. Similar to CMW, we assume that the
buyer is well diversified who will optimally relever the firm, see Leland (1994). The value
of the firm after sale is the value of an optimally levered firm in the complete market, i.e.
V ∗(yu) given by
V ∗(y) =
[
1− τm + τm
(
1− θ1 − κ(1− τm)θ1
τm
)1/θ1] y
r − ν , (2.5)
After the entrepreneur exits from her business through either default or cash-out, she
lives on her own financial income and faces a standard complete-markets consumption and
portfolio choice problem.
An investor is characterized by her initial wealth W0, a time-discount rate δ and her
preference U(·). She seeks to choose a bond coupon b and a consumption process c and
make investment decisions so as to maximize her expected lifetime time-additive utility of
56 for details. Equation( A.6) for the default option only and Equation( A.14) for the case with cash-out
option.
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consumption:
E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−δs)U(cs)ds
]
. (2.6)
In the following, we consider the optimization problem Equation( 2.6) under CARA util-
ity to reduce the dimension of the double-barrier problem. That is
U(c) = − exp(−γc)/γ, c ∈ <, (2.7)
where γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter.
2.3 Model Solution
In this section, we analyze the entrepreneur’s consumption, portfolio choice, default / cash-
out, and financing decisions under borrowing constraints and the equity-for-guarantee swap.
The idiosyncratic risk of the entrepreneurial firm invalidates the standard two-step complete-
markets analysis due to the nonseparability between value maximization and consumption
smoothing.
We note that the entrepreneur’s problem is significantly different from that considered
by CMW. In fact, the problem here is much more challenging than CMW since the guarantee
cost depends on both the default threshold and the cash-out threshold, which conversely
depend on the guarantee cost at the same time.
In order to derive the solution, in the first step, we solve the standard Merton consump-
tion and portfolio choice problem faced by the entrepreneur, see Merton (1971), after she
exits from her business via either cashing out or defaulting on the debt. In the second step,
we solve a mixture of optimal control and optimal stopping problem. To achieve this goal,
we note that the entrepreneur’s optimization problem is a time-homogeneous Markov con-
trol problem. Therefore, we first derive the guarantee cost, which is a function of the default
threshold yd and the cash-out threshold yu. Then, for any given yd and yu, we find the
maximum for
E
[∫ τD
0
exp (−δs)U(cs)ds+ exp(−τD)Je(WτD)
]
, yd ≤ y0 ≤ yu, (2.8)
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where W is the entrepreneur’s financial wealth process, D = {(w, y) ∈ <2|yd ≤ y ≤ yu},
τD ≡ inf{t ≥ 0|(Wt, yt) /∈ D} = min{Td, Tu} is stoping time7, and the function Je(·) is
derived by solving the standard Merton problem (Merton 1971) in the first step and given
by
Je(w) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (2.9)
. It is clear that this maximum is also a function of the default threshold yd and the cash-out
threshold yu. Therefore, we need to solve a constrained nonlinear programming problem to
obtain the optimal default threshold y∗d and the cash-out threshold y
∗
u. Finally, we determine
the entrepreneur’s initial investment and optimal capital structure.
Remark 1. Throughout the text, from an application’s point of view, we assume the initial state of
the system belongs to the domainD, i.e. (W0, y0) ∈ D for a practical reason. For example, if y0 ≤ yd,
there is no need to start a non-profit business.
2.3.1 Guarantee Costs and Equity-for-Guarantee Swaps
Unlike the traditional credit hypothecation, though, the entrepreneurial firm in the new
credit guarantee scheme must pay to the guarantee company a portion (ϕ) of equity instead
of regular guarantee fees. Thus we call ϕ the guarantee cost of the equity-for-guarantee
swap.
Generally speaking, a guarantee company is usually a diversified investor who signs
such contracts with a large number of firms and therefore the idiosyncratic risk of a en-
trepreneurship firm is well-diversified. This means that the value (Pguar) of compensatory
payment must be equal to the market value (equilibrium value) of the equity allocated to
the insurer. That is
Pguar = ϕE0(y; yd, yu), (2.10)
where E0(y; yd, yu) is the market value of equity of the entrepreneurial firm, which depends
on the exit threshold pair (yd, yu) as well as revenue y. The value E0(y; yd, yu) is given by
Equation( A.8) if the cash-out option is prohibited and given by Equation( A.17) if the cash-
out option is admissible.
7Let T be the set of {Ft : t ≥ 0}-stopping times. Thus the default timing and cash-out timing are Td ∈ T and
Tu ∈ T respectively.
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Therefore, the guarantee cost ϕ is given by
ϕ ≡ ϕ(y; yd, yu) =
(
φb
r − ιA(yd)
)
q˜(y)/E0(y; yd, yu)
=
(
φb
r
−ι(1−τm) ydr−µ
)
q˜(y)
(1−τe)
(
y
r−µ− br
)
−(1−τe)
(
yd
r−µ− br
)
q˜(y)+
[
V ∗(yu)−(1−τe)
(
yd
r−µ− br
)]
q¯(y)
,
(2.11)
where V ∗(y), q˜(y) and q¯(y) are defined in Equations ( A.12), (A.14) and (A.15).
Remark 2. The guarantee cost here is fundamentally different from that given by Yang and Zhang
(2013), which does not take into account that the entrepreneur is a risk-averse individual and has the
option to cash out. For this reason, thanks to game theory, the equilibrium value of equity must be
related to the entrepreneur’s decisions on the cash-out option and a default threshold, which is clearly
different from that in Yang and Zhang (2013) based on a risk-neutral world.
2.3.2 Consumption and Portfolio Choice after Exit
After exiting from her business, the entrepreneur lives on her own financial wealth and faces
the standard consumption and portfolio choice problem in Merton (1971).
The entrepreneur’s wealth process follows
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r)− ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt. (2.12)
The consumption and portfolio rules are given by
c∗(w) = r
(
w +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)
, (2.13)
Π∗ =
η
γrσM
. (2.14)
The maximum of the expected lifetime time-additive utility of consumption is given by
Equation (2.9).
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2.3.3 Entrepreneur’s Decisions and Utility Indifference Prices
Before exit, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth evolves as follows,
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r) + (1− τe)(1− ϕ)(y − b)− ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt, 0 < t < τD. (2.15)
Compared to the exogenously given fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur in CMW,
the fraction 1 − ϕ in our model is endogenously determined by the equity-for-guarantee
swap in Equation (2.11), which also depends on the entrepreneur’s decisions on default and
cash-out. For this reason, we first solve the optimization problem Equation(2.8) for any
given exit threshold pair (yd, yu). Under this case, the entrepreneur’s value function Js(w, y)
satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation according to Bellman’s principle
of optimality:
sup
c≥0,Π
{U(c) + (rw + Π(µM − r) + (1− τe)(1− ϕ)(y − b)− c)Jsw(w, y)
+ (ΠσM )
2
2 J
s
ww(w, y) + ΠσMσρyJ
s
wy(w, y) + µyyJ
s
y (w, y) +
σ2y2
2 J
s
yy(w, y)
−δJs(w, y)} = 0,
(2.16)
with the value-matching conditions
Js(w, yd) = J
e(w), (2.17)
Js(w, yu) = J
e(w + (1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)− F0 −K − τg((1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)−K − I)). (2.18)
The first-order conditions for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice are:
U ′(c) = Jsw(w, y), (2.19)
Π =
−Jsw(w, y)
Jsww(w, y)
(
µM − r
σM 2
)
+
−Jswy(w, y)
Jsww(w, y)
ρσy
σM
. (2.20)
According to utility indifference pricing principle, for the current revenue yd < y < yu, the
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utility indifference price (also called subjective value)8 of equity owned by the entrepreneur,
denoted by G(y), satisfies
Js(w, y) = Je(w +G(y)) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (2.21)
Substituting Equations (2.9) and (2.21) into Equations ( 2.16) - (2.18), we obtain the following
theorem immediately:
Theorem 2.3.1. The entrepreneur exits from her business when the revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0}
reaches either the default threshold yd or the cash-out threshold yu, whichever comes first. For any
given exit threshold pair (yd, yu), liquid wealth level w and revenue yd < y < yu, the optimal
consumption and portfolio rule is given by
c∗(w, y) = r
[
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
]
, (2.22)
Π∗(w, y) =
η
γrσM
− ρσ
σM
yG′(y), (2.23)
where G(y) is the utility indifference price of equity owned by the entrepreneur and is a solution of
the following ordinary differential equation:
rG(y) = (1− τe)(1− ϕ)(y − b) + (µy − ρση)yG′(y)
+σ
2y2
2 G
′′(y)− γr(1−ρ2)σ2y22 G′(y)2,
(2.24)
subject to the boundary conditions:
G(yd) = 0, (2.25)
G(yu) = (1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)− F0 −K − τg((1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)−K − I). (2.26)
In order to complete the computation of the entrepreneur’s optimization problem, we
now need to derive the optimal default threshold y∗d and optimal cash-out threshold y
∗
u,
such that the value function Js(w, y) is maximized. Equivalently, we need only to find the
8Thanks to the exponential utility assumption, the utility indifference price is independent of the wealth level
of the entrepreneur.
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maximum point (y∗d, y
∗
u) of the functionG(y; yd, yu), i.e. the utility indifference price of equity
owned by the entrepreneur, with regard to independent variables yd and yu for any given
revenue level9. The constrained nonlinear programming problem is solved by numerical
methods.
Remark 3. At first sight this theorem is similar to CMW, but the fraction 1 − ϕ of equity owned
by the entrepreneur here is endogenously determined under the newly invented equity-for-guarantee
swap.10 As a result, one of the distinctions from CMW is that the state transition Equation ( 2.15)
itself depends on the optimal stopping times. Therefore, to derive the optimal default threshold and
cash-out threshold more effectively, we solve a nonlinear programming problem instead of utilizing
the smooth-pasting conditions as done by CMW.
Equations (2.22) and (2.23) indicate that the entrepreneur will consume the implied value
G(y) and use the market portfolio to dynamically hedge the entrepreneurial business risk.
Equation (2.24) implies that if the absolute risk-aversion index equals 0 (i.e. the entrepreneur
is risk-neutral towards the idiosyncratic risk), or the idiosyncratic risk volatility  is 0, Equa-
tion (2.24) becomes the standard equilibrium pricing equation.
Similar to CMW, Equation (2.24) implies that both systematic and idiosyncratic risks
contribute to the risk premium for an entrepreneurial firm. This is different from a public
firm, where the risk premium is determined by the firm’s systematic risk through the classic
CAPM model. Specifically, the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium, denoted by ξs(y)
and ξi(y) respectively, are given by
ξs(y) = ρσηy
G′(y)
G(y)
, (2.27)
ξi(y) =
γr
2
(
√
1− ρ2σyG′(y))2
G(y)
. (2.28)
As we expected, the idiosyncratic risk premium is zero once the risk-averse index (γ) is zero
or the absolute value (|ρ|) of the correlation coefficient between the project payoff and the
9Obviously, the maximum point will not depend on the current revenue level in our model. Thus we find
the maximum point at y0 = 1, and we set the constraint (0, y0)′ ≤ (yd, yu)′ ≤ (y0, y¯)′, where y¯ is a sufficiently
large boundary to include y∗u.
10Here endogenously means that the guarantee cost ϕ is given explicitly in Equation (2.11).
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return on market portfolio is one, i.e. idiosyncratic risk disappears. On the contrary, the
systematic risk premium does not depend on the risk-averse index (γ) directly.
2.3.4 Capital Structure under Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
Now we turn to the entrepreneur’s initial decision on the optimal debt borrowed from the
lender for investing in the project in order to maximize the entrepreneur’s net profit under
the equity-for-guarantee swap at time t = 0.
The cash amount that the entrepreneur borrows from a lender is the value F (y0) of the
cash flow received by the lender from the borrower, which depends on the coupon b of
the debt. After the initial one-time lump-sum cost I , the entrepreneur acquires F (y0) − I
with her own funds in the project. For this reason, the entrepreneur’s initial optimization
problem or optimal capital structure to start the project is to find optimal coupon level b∗,
which maximizes the entrepreneur’s net profit (target function)
P (y0; b, I) ≡ G(y0) + [F (y0)− I]. (2.29)
The entrepreneur should abandon the project if the maximum P ∗(y0; b∗, I) is less than zero.
Furthermore, we identify a breakeven investment cost I∗ by solving a root-finding problem
P ∗(y0; b∗, I∗) = 0.
Denote by Pˆ ∗(y0) the maximum net profit obtained by an entrepreneur without signing
an equity-for-guarantee swap contract, and by W s(y0) the welfare loss of this entrepreneur
because the swap is not signed, i.e.
W s(y0) ≡ P ∗(y0)− Pˆ ∗(y0). (2.30)
In other words, W s is the loss of utility without equity-for-guarantee swap. It is the addi-
tional endowment that an entrepreneur without equity-for-guarantee swap needs in order
to achieve the same expected utility under the case where the equity-for-guarantee swap
is signed. Furthermore, we will distinguish two cases without equity-for-guarantee swap.
One case is that the firm can issue debt with the protective covenant yd = b rather than
optimal default decision. While in another case, the firm is an unlevered firm since the
entrepreneur is unable to issue debt because of the borrowing constraint of low credibility.
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After the entrepreneur invests in the project, a natural measure of leverage for the en-
trepreneur is the private leverage ratio L(y0) defined by
L(y0) =
F (y0)
S(y0)
, (2.31)
where S(y0) is the total subjective value of the entrepreneurial firm. Under our equity-for-
guarantee swap arrangement, there are three claims: inside equity held by the entrepreneur,
diversified outside equity held by the insurer, and outside debt held by the lender. However,
in contrast to CMW, the total subjective value in our model is given by only
S(y0) = G(y0) + F (y0), (2.32)
which excludes the value ϕE0 of the outside equity held by the insurer because the value of
the outside debt held by the lender has taken it into account already.
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2.4 Discussion of Entrepreneurial Finance
In this Section, we use a numerical example to give strong evidence that EGS plays a vital
role in alleviating entrepreneurs’s financing constraints. In order to make a comparison,
following CMW, our numerical results are based on the following annualized baseline pa-
rameter values: risk-free interest rate r = 3%, expected growth rate of revenue µy = 4%,
market price of risk, i.e. the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, η = 0.4, asset recovery
rate ι = 0.6. The entrepreneur’s rate of time preference is δ = 3% and the initial level of the
project value is y0 = 1. The initial investment cost for the project is I = 10 and the cash-out
cost is K = 27. The effective marginal Miller tax rate τm of a public firm is set to 11.29%
as in Graham (2000) and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007)11. The tax rate τe of en-
trepreneurial firm is set to equal τm for emphasizing the the entrepreneur’s nondiversifiable
idiosyncratic risk. The effective capital gains tax rate from selling the business is τg = 10%.
In addition, we set the guarantee level φ = 50%, the systematic volatility of growth rate
ζ = 10%, and idiosyncratic volatility  = 10%. Hence, the total volatility of the project
σ = 0.020.5, correlation coefficient ρ = 0.50.5. We consider three values of the risk-aversion
parameter γ ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Similar to CMW, the baseline parameter values are carefully selected in order to make
sure that the assumption yd < y0 < yu holds. That is, we excludes two special cases: One
corresponds to a sufficiently large asset recovery rate ι, together with a sufficiently high
guarantee level φ and a large risk aversion γ, which will lead to an immediate default (i.e.
yd = y0); The other corresponds to a sufficiently small cash-out cost K, which will make the
entrepreneur sell the firm immediately (i.e. yu = y0).
At the very beginning, a sensitivity analysis of G(y) andG′(y) is provided in Table 2.1.
2.4.1 Equity Value with Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
We apply Figure 2.1 to illustrate the properties of the utility indifference price G of equity,
i.e. the value of the cash flow (1 − τe)(1 − ϕ)(y − b), received by the entrepreneur with the
equity-for-guarantee swap. Figure 2.1 shows the results under the case of default option
11Similar to CMW, the effective Miller tax rate here integrates the corporate income tax, individuals equity,
and interest income tax. Using Millers formula for the effective tax rate, and setting the interest income tax at
0.30, corporate income tax at 0.31, and the individuals long-term equity (distribution) tax at 0.10, we obtain an
effective tax rate of 11.29%.
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TABLE 2.1: The table presents the sensitivity analysis of the subjective value G(y) and its derivative
G′(y) to the changes of guarantee level φ, idiosyncratic volatility , and cash-out cost K for risk
aversion γ = 1 and the current project revenue y0 = 1.
φ 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
G(y) 12.96 10.60 9.76 3.40 1.38 0.87 0.50
G′(y) 21.86 20.59 19.81 11.17 5.69 3.68 2.95
 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
G(y) 18.16 16.37 9.76 3.92 3.63 3.20 3.16
G′(y) 28.72 26.20 19.81 11.16 9.44 7.83 7.17
K 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00
G(y) 10.02 9.80 9.75 9.72 9.71 9.70 9.70
G′(y) 20.27 19.90 19.78 19.73 19.70 19.69 19.68
only and under the case with both default option and cash-out option respectively. After
that, we present the risk premiums demanded by the entrepreneur in Figure 2.2. Here we
let τe = 0 to exclude the effects of tax.
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FIGURE 2.1: The figure depicts the subjective values G(y) of equity held by
the entrepreneur, its derivatives and the value of going public, i.e. the intrin-
sic value of the cash-out option, with the equity-for-guarantee swap under
the case of taking default option only and the case of taking both default op-
tion and cash-out option respectively, under the assumption of γ = 1, τe = 0
together with the baseline parameter values.
The results in Figure 2.1 under the equity-for-guarantee swap are similar to CMW if we
think the amount of equity allocated to the insurer in our model as the outside equity in
CMW, who do not take into account the swap. We find that the subjective values G(y) of
equity are convex functions of revenue y when it is sufficiently low, i.e. the default option
is deep in the money, or it is sufficiently high, i.e. the cash-out option is deep in the money.
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Under other situations, the subjective values are concave because the two options are not
deep in the money and the risk aversion of the entrepreneur (precautionary saving demand)
dominates the impact of a growth of revenue y.
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FIGURE 2.2: This figure shows the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium
under equity-for-guarantee swap with default option, cash-out option, τe = 0
and baseline parameter values.
The properties of risk premium demanded by the entrepreneur shown in Figure 2.2 are
similar to CMW as well. On the one hand, when the revenue y is small and approaches
default threshold yd, the systematic risk premium ξs(y) is similar to the standard valuation
model and it diverges to infinity as seen in (2.27) because of the significant leverage effect
(the equity is a levered position). The systematic risk premium ξs(y) rises when the revenue
y approaches the cash-out threshold yu because the cash-out option makes the valueGmore
sensitive to cash flow shocks. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk premium ξi(y) is
small when y is close to yd. When revenue y is large, its growth leads to a fast growth
of ξi(y) because the conditional idiosyncratic variance (
√
1− ρ2σyG′(y))2 rises faster than
G(y), as seen in Equation (2.28).
2.4.2 Comparison of Capital Structures
We compare three capital structures under different financing arrangements in Table 2.2
without taxes τe = 0 and in Table 2.3 with taxes τe = τm = 11.29% respectively. In Tables 2.2
and 2.3, Panel A represents the unlevered entrepreneurial firm; Panel B is the entrepreneur
who is able to choose optimal risky debt but is unable to determine optimal default due to
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the protective covenant yd = b; Panel C exhibits the entrepreneurial firm with optimal lever-
age and optimal default supported by the equity-for-guarantee swap. Table 2.2 shows the
special case where entrepreneurs acquire only diversification benefits without tax benefits
from risky debt.
Similar conclusions to CMW are found from the two tables. First, the model is equiva-
lent to the complete-market benchmark when the risk aversion γ → 0 and τe = 0, and hence
the firm is valued at the market value 33.33. Second, the subjective value for a risk-averse
entrepreneur decreases because they discount the nontradable equity due to nondiversifi-
able idiosyncratic business risks. Third, more risk-averse entrepreneurs issue more debt in
order to achieve greater diversification benefits, and as a result, it leads to a less subjective
value of equity held by the entrepreneur.
TABLE 2.2: The table gives guarantee cost ϕ∗, optimal coupon b, debt value F0, equilibrium value
ϕE0 of equity held by the insurer, subjective value G0 of equity held by the entrepreneur, optimal
leverage L0, credit spread CS, 10 years default probability pd(10), 10 years cash-out probability
pu(10), and welfare loss W s under the tax rate τe = 0 and optimal capital structure with cash-out
option and equity-for-guarantee swap for risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
γ ϕ∗ b F0 ϕE0 G0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10) W s
(%) (%) (bp) (%) (%)
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.34
2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.09 0.54
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.05 1.65 0.00 27.05 5.75 2.89 0.00 0.04 0.08
2.00 0.00 0.11 3.57 0.00 22.92 13.46 8.35 0.00 0.60 0.15
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.05 0.13 4.48 0.01 24.30 15.57 1.25 0.00 0.04 0.00
2.00 0.73 0.29 9.11 0.18 17.53 34.19 16.81 0.00 0.60 0.00
More importantly, our results reveal large increased benefits for the entrepreneur through
introducing equity-for-guarantee swap. Under this swap, the entrepreneur is not forced to
default by the protective covenant even when the revenue y is lower than the coupon b as
demanded by the protective covenant. Accordingly, the entrepreneur is able to choose the
endogenous optimal default threshold yd that is generally lower than b. In other words,
thanks to the swap, the entrepreneur has deep pockets now without liquidity constraints,
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which is an assumption widely applied by CMW. For this reason, we argue that the equity-
for-guarantee swap in our model makes the important assumption in CMW feasible.
Admittedly, the entrepreneur with the swap faces higher credit spreads and default
probabilities due to higher optimal leverage if the debt is guaranteed by only φ = 50%
level, i.e. the insurer only ensures that the debt holder receives 50% of the value b/r. Cer-
tainly, credit spreads and default probabilities can be reduced by raising the guarantee level
φ if it is agreed by the three parties. However, a higher guarantee level φ demands that the
entrepreneur should pay a higher portion of equity to the insurer in exchange for the guar-
antee, i.e. the guarantee cost gets higher. If the guarantee cost is greater than or equal to
one, then it means that no insurer wants to sign the swap contract with the entrepreneur.
From Tables 2.2 and 2.3, thanks to the equity-for-guarantee swap, the entrepreneur with
the guarantee achieves a considerable welfare increment, i.e. the welfare losses W s of the
entrepreneurs without the guarantee are significant. The welfare increment is enlarged by
a higher tax rate and a higher risk-aversion index of the entrepreneur. In particular, the
welfare increment gets even more relative to the case of no leverage, which is particularly
common in China among others, since a large number of entrepreneurs of SMEs are funda-
mentally unable to issue debt directly.
TABLE 2.3: This table gives guarantee cost ϕ∗, optimal coupon b, debt value F0, equilibrium value
ϕE0 of equity held by the insurer, subjective value G0 of equity held by the entrepreneur, optimal
leverage L0, credit spread CS, 10 years default probability pd(10), 10 years cash-out probability
pu(10), and welfare loss W s under the tax rate τe = τm = 11.29%, optimal capital structure with
cash-out option and equity-for-guarantee swap for risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
γ ϕ∗ b F0 ϕE0 G0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10) W s
(%) (%) (bp) (%) (%)
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.52
2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 2.43
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 0.00 0.18 5.85 0.00 24.07 19.54 16.43 0.00 0.00 0.44
1.00 0.00 0.20 6.42 0.00 19.79 24.49 19.32 0.00 0.21 1.08
2.00 0.00 0.24 7.53 0.00 16.87 30.88 25.21 0.02 1.28 1.97
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 3.14 0.46 14.02 0.53 16.33 46.21 30.79 0.05 0.00 0.00
1.00 7.17 0.61 17.53 0.99 9.76 64.24 49.46 0.55 0.10 0.00
2.00 21.10 0.84 21.72 1.99 4.64 82.39 84.53 4.93 0.21 0.00
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2.4.3 Analysis of Welfare Loss
To further demonstrate the increased benefits resulting from the equity-for-guarantee swap
for the entrepreneur, we present comparative statics on welfare loss W s for different param-
eter values in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. We only show that the results of welfare loss W s incurred
by the entrepreneur without leverage due to the pervasive low borrowing capacity of an
SME. The findings on the welfare loss W s of the entrepreneur with the protective covenant
are similar.
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FIGURE 2.3: The figure gives comparative statics for welfare loss W s with
respect to idiosyncratic volatilities  and guarantee levels φ.
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FIGURE 2.4: This figure presents comparative statics for welfare lossW s with
respect to cash-out costs K and correlation coefficients ρ.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 highlight large benefits resulting from the equity-for-guarantee swap.
Compared with the unlevered firm, the equity-for-guarantee swap raises net profit, and the
welfare increment ascends for more risk-averse entrepreneurs who optimally take higher
leverage. First, for a risk-averse entrepreneur, the welfare loss W s increases substantially
with the idiosyncratic volatility  and the guarantee level φ. Second, if the cash-out cost
K is small, the welfare loss W s increases quickly with K for a sufficiently risk-averse en-
trepreneur, and then keep unchanged if K is sufficiently large. It also shows that the wel-
fare increment increases quickly with the risk-aversion index and does not depend on the
cash-out cost if the cost is sufficiently large. Finally, the welfare loss W s decreases with the
correlation coefficient ρ since a large absolute value of the correlation coefficient ρ means a
less idiosyncratic risk, keeping parameter σ unchanged.
2.4.4 Breakeven Investment Cost
The previous subsection explores the benefits of the equity-for-guarantee swap in financing
decisions. In this subsection, we focus on the effects of the equity-for-guarantee swap on an
entrepreneur’s investment decisions. Under the assumption of τe = 0, CMW examine the
effects of idiosyncratic volatility  ∈ {0.15, 0.20, 0.25} on the breakeven investment cost I∗
since the NPV analysis is not applicable in incomplete markets. Here we provide more de-
tailed analysis on the cut-off rule I∗ and emphasize the benefits of the equity-for-guarantee
swap.
As before, we compare the breakeven cost I∗ under three different capital structures, i.e.
no leverage without the swap, optimal leverage with bankruptcy protection but without the
equity-for-guarantee swap, and the optimal capital structure with the swap. As reported in
Table 2.4, generally speaking, the breakeven investment cost I∗ decreases for a more risk-
averse entrepreneur and/or a higher idiosyncratic volatility of the revenue. For instance,
if  = 0.90, an entrepreneur with risk aversion γ = 0 (risk-neutral) under the swap (Panel
C) will invest in the project even the investment cost is as much as 27.26. By contrast, if
the entrepreneur is risk-averse enough, say γ = 2, she will give up the project once the
investment cost is greater than 21.55.
However, the trend of I∗ does not hold true all the time. In fact, we notice that in Panels
B and C of Table 2.4, as idiosyncratic volatility  grows further, breakeven investment costs
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fluctuate slightly. This is because the subjective values of equity held by the entrepreneur
include the values of the default option and the cash-out option, both of which increase
with a growth of the volatility of idiosyncratic risk although for a risk-averse investor, the
subjective value of larger risk asset will be less in general.
In addition, we find that in Panel B under risk aversion γ = 2, the breakeven invest-
ment cost is somewhat higher than that under γ = 1 if the volatility of idiosyncratic risk is
large enough, say  ≥ 0.4. This is because a more risk-averse entrepreneur would borrow
more money from the bank and get more diversified benefits and more tax shields under
bankruptcy protection yd = b.
TABLE 2.4: This table gives breakeven investment cost I∗ under tax rate τe = τm = 11.29% for
different volatility  of idiosyncratic risk and risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
 = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 29.51 29.17 28.59 28.00 27.52 27.15 26.87 26.66 26.50
1.00 25.78 20.99 17.83 15.92 14.73 13.98 13.48 13.12 12.86
2.00 23.94 18.44 15.18 13.30 12.14 11.37 10.92 10.60 10.37
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 29.97 29.39 28.78 28.14 27.63 27.24 26.96 26.74 26.58
1.00 26.29 21.31 18.04 17.61 17.78 17.73 17.70 17.68 17.66
2.00 24.49 18.68 17.71 17.84 17.81 17.80 17.79 17.78 17.77
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 30.35 29.69 28.97 28.51 28.20 27.55 27.51 27.35 27.26
1.00 27.29 25.42 24.43 23.69 23.65 22.56 22.92 22.93 22.69
2.00 26.36 24.90 23.10 22.78 22.24 21.97 21.58 21.52 21.55
Actually, under the equity-for-guarantee swap, for a more risk-averse entrepreneur, the
breakeven investment cost decreases gradually and it is considerably greater than the corre-
sponding breakeven investment cost if the swap contract is not signed. These results imply
that an entrepreneur armed with the equity-for-guarantee swap is more willing to invest,
since the swap provides the entrepreneur with the eligibility not only to issue debt but also
to freely choose the time to default.
More importantly, a high breakeven investment cost means a large net profit obtained
by the entrepreneur after investing in the project. By comparing the three financing schemes
in Table 2.4, we find that a risk-averse entrepreneur obtains considerable welfare increments
resulting from the equity-for-guarantee swap, although the welfare increments are very lim-
ited if the entrepreneur is risk-neutral.
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In addition, the stable values appear earlier for higher risk aversion. For instance in
Panel C, the breakeven cost I∗ falls to around 27 after  = 0.7 for the risk aversion level
γ → 0, and it is close to 23 after  = 0.6 for γ = 1, while the level value is about 22 after  = 5
for γ = 2. In fact, I∗ = G(y0|I∗) + F (y0|I∗), and equity is a call option on levered firm’s
operating assets with the value of the debt as the strike price. Growing volatilities make the
option become out of the money from in the money, therefore I∗ decreases firstly and then
the loss is limited.
We notice the exception that the breakeven cost I∗ grows slightly at γ = 2 and  ∈
[0.3, 0.35] in Panel B, which is attributed to the protective covenant yd = b. It falls slightly
with increasing idiosyncratic risk  difference in I∗ between Panel B and A increases with
idiosyncratic volatility , and the difference in I∗ between Panel C and A increases more.
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2.5 Conclusion
In China, there are a large number of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), who are
almost impossible or difficult to get bank loan to start a new business because of too low
credibility and lack of guarantee, even if the business is substantially profitable.
Usually, it is difficult or even impossible for SMEs to get bank loan to start a new business
because of low credibility and lack of guarantee, even if the business is substantially prof-
itable. There are a large number of SMEs encountering such obstacles and moreover, a great
many students graduate from college every year (e.g. record-high 6.99 million in China in
2013), and with the increasingly serious employment situation, many governments encour-
age them to start their own businesses. Clearly all of them need funds, which in general
cannot be borrowed directly from a bank. In order to overcome such financing constraints,
a financial product, called equity-for-guarantee swap, which was invented in China since
2002, is becoming more and more popular. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no quantitative study on such swaps apart from Yang and Zhang (2013), who consider only
the equilibrium pricing problem for a firm with the equity-for-guarantee swap.
Chapter 2 provides a dynamic incomplete-market framework that models the impact
and interactions of the two frictions: borrowing constraints and lack of diversification,
on entrepreneurial investment, interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financ-
ing, and business exit decisions. We show that the equity-for-guarantee swap brings great
benefits to the entrepreneur. The equity-for-guarantee swap improves the capital structure
trade-off among tax, diversification benefit and financial distress costs. Hence, issuing cov-
ered risky debt generates substantial diversification benefits and tax benefits. The more
risk-averse the entrepreneur, or the higher the idiosyncratic risk, the greater the benefit. Nat-
urally, the most important advantage of the newly invented swap is to effectively overcome
borrowing constraints on an entrepreneur, who are unable to invest in a project without the
swap, even though the project is valuable.
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Hedge Fund Seeding Innovation with
Fees-for-seed and Fees-for-guarantee
Swaps
Coauthored with Binghua Huang 1
Abstract
To alleviate the financing constraints resulting from severe asymmetric information in the hedge fund
seeding stage, we have developed a new financial derivative product called fees-for-guarantee swap.
This swap works together with the well-known fees-for-seed swap and actually plays a role in forcing
managers to put a fraction of their earnings aside in advance in order that they refund the initial
investment of the seeder once they default. We set up a dynamic continuous-time framework and
provide closed-form prices for seed capital, guarantee costs and other claims. Our numerical results
indicate that the incentive compensation, managerial ownership and the possibility of fund liquida-
tion significantly mitigate the manager’s risk-shifting incentive.
1Mr Binghua Huang is currently PhD candidate in Finance at Shanghai Jiao Tong Universith, China
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3.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been a significant increase in both the number of hedge
fund seeders and the amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding. According to
HFM-Week research, in November 2011, seeders had approximately $4.6 billion in available
capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
In China, institutional investors also show increasing interest in hedge funds seeding as
the nation’s wealthy look for more ways to invest their money and slow but steady financial
reform offers budding managers more ways to play the markets. CITIC Securities Futures,
China’s biggest investment bank, has launched a fund that will seed new and established
hedge fund firms in the country.2 Separately, the asset management arm of another local
brokerage, Hwabao Securities, is launching a similar fund with one billion yuan to invest
in partnership with KKM Capital, a Shanghai company dedicated to helping Chinese hedge
fund.
Despite the recent growth in available seed capital, there still remains a tremendous
shortage of capital for the early-stage funds (ESFs, henceforth) because most capital allo-
cators increasingly focus on larger established hedge funds considered highly credible. In
addition, a larger talent pool of ESFs managers is now competing for the available seed
capital. Moreover, barriers to entry for ESFs are much steeper today than that before the
2008’s financial crisis3. Consequently, the financing constraints faced by the ESFs managers
nowadays are much more serious than in the past.
Given this state of affairs, more and more emerging managers are likely to turn to seed
investors for early stage capital. To be involved in the hedge fund seeding business, a seed
investor or a seeder commonly commits to providing a remarkable amount of seed capital to
an ESFs manager as an “anchor investor” in a new fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced
2CITIC Securities is no stranger to seeding hedge funds, as it invested $20 million in Hong Hong-based
Vision Gain Capital in 2008. The newly-established fund has about 2 billion yuan ($330 million) in capital that
will invest in Chinese hedge funds prompted by the country’s growing interest in the sector as its growing
number of billionaires are looking for alternative ways to invest their money, according to Financial Times’s
report.
3Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act compels the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose reporting requirements on all hedge funds as it deems necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the assessment of systemic risk. The article, “Launch bad; Hedge
funds”, published in The Economist 20 Apr. 2013: 79 (US) states that it is much harder to break into the hedge-
fund world than before, because of the rising expenses, more risk-averse investors and enhanced regulation.
3.1. Introduction 35
economics” which is usually the fees4 that the ESFs manager generates from the entire pool
of assets in the fund. It is not uncommon that seeders receive a portion of the hedge fund’s
revenue stream to get greater return potential than that of the ordinary investor through the
hedge fund seeding vehicle. If fees-for-seed swap is structured properly, the seeding vehicle
can be highly beneficial to both ESFs managers and seeders5.
Although the seeding approach in practice has, to some extent, solved ESFs managers’
financing constraints, there is still a huge gap between the seeding capital demand and sup-
ply in the hedge fund seeding business. This is mainly because of the severe information
asymmetry between seeders and ESFs managers, which has always been the key factor hold-
ing back the development of the hedge fund seeding business, especially in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, an insurer was firstly introduced in Chapter 3, through
an innovative contract, to solve the problem of information asymmetry by improving the
ESFs manager’s credibility.
Inspired by small and medium-sized enterprises’ experience of overcoming borrowing
constraints in China as discussed in Yang and Zhang (2013), the financing constraints re-
sult of information asymmetry faced by ESFs managers will be largely alleviated by intro-
ducing the fees-for-guarantee swap supported by a commercial guarantee-company or an
insurer. The rationale is that fees-for-guarantee swap can significantly mitigate the informa-
tion asymmetry between a manager and a seeder, thus encourages the seeder to invest in
the hedge fund seeding stage with confidence, as facing little credit risk. Unlike the tradi-
tional credit hypothecation, however, ESFs managers in the new credit guarantee scheme
must pay to the guarantee company a certain portion of her management fees, as guarantee
costs instead of regular guarantee fees. Once the hedge fund is exogenously liquidated by
a crisis shock or endogenously by investors, the seeder can still get compensatory payment
from the insurer. In order to guarantee the seeder’s payoff and control her downside risk
4Hedge fund managers normally receive 20% of the increase in fund value in excess of the last recorded
maximum, i.e. high-water-mark as incentive fees in addition to 2% of the asset under management as annual
fees, which “two-twenty” viewed as the industry’s norm. Several academic articles study the characteristics of
hedge fund fees, such as Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (1999)), and Aragon and Nanda (2012), as well
as several articles in the Wall Street Journal.
5A widely accepted rule of thumb is for a seeder to expect 1% of revenues for each $1 million of seed capital
for seed transactions no larger than $50 million. However, it would not be surprising to see a 25% revenue
share on a seed investment of US $100 million as seed arrangements can vary substantially based on factors
such as the experience of the manager or alpha strategy, the amount of seed capital provided, and the relative
negotiating power of each party.
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well, it is not unreasonable to define that the present value of the compensatory payment
plus the annual fees received from the manager to the seeder should be breakeven or equal
to her initial investment under the arrangement of these innovative swaps.
Although there is a thumb rule in designing seed arrangements and a few simple mod-
els featuring hedge fund seeding return in practice6, the theoretical research on the contract
costs and optimal designing of these contracts is still unavailable. In this article, we firstly
provide closed-form solutions to the seed capital costs and guarantee costs using standard
continuous-time methodology under the arrangements of these innovative swaps. More-
over, we develop a numerical procedure to analyze the impact of managerial ownership,
fund liquidation on the risk shifting behavior of the ESFs manager who has a convex payoff
compensation structure.
Chapter 3 is closely related to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), which provides
the first quantitative intertemporal valuation framework of investors’ payoff and managers’
fees in a setting where the fund’s value follows a log-normal process and the fund man-
agers have no discretion over the choice of portfolio. However Chapter 3 mainly focuses on
the innovation of the hedge fund seeding business like fees-for-seed and fees-for-guarantee
swaps. Moreover, we provide a dynamic framework for valuing the costs of these swaps, as
well as modeling the impact of the so-called high-water mark, managerial ownership and
fund liquidation on ESFs managers’ risk shifting behavior, in hedge fund seeding stage.
Ewald and Zhang (2016) have done a similar research on the hedge fund seeding busi-
nesses, however, they focus on a risk-averse manager’s decision and highlight the effect
of frictions of incomplete markets. They provide a dynamic valuation model of the hedge
fund seeding business, by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-
averse manager, who launches a hedge fund via a seeding vehicle. Chapter 3 introduces a
new financial product called fees-for-guarantee swap, to solve the serious asymmetric in-
formation problem between ESFs managers and seeders. Yang and Zhang (2013) provide
a formal study on equity-for-guarantee swap on SMEs’ financing problems, which share
some similarities of the financing problems of ESFs managers. Similarly, ESFs managers
face serious financing constraints and these financial constraints can be largely solved by
introducing fees-for-guarantee swap and fees-for-seed swap innovative swaps. Moreover,
6For example, Larch Lane Advisors (LLC) has constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows
for a seeded fund, featuring the innovative seeding strategy.
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our model focuses on the impacts of these swaps on ESFs manager’s risk shifting behavior
and highlights hedge fund management at the hedge fund seeding stage.
Our article is also related to the substantial literature that examine the effects of convex
payoff compensation on the risk choices of hedge fund managers.7 Carpenter (2000) asserts
that it is optimal for hedge fund managers, who faces no explicit downside risk, to choose
infinite volatility as asset value goes to zero. On the contrary, managers should reduce the
volatility to ensure that liquidation does not occur. Similarly, Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro
(2007) and Aragon and Nanda (2012) argue that the convex payoff structure of a manager
does not necessarily induce risk shifting when fund undertakes poor performance, as long
as she is exposed to downside risk, either through her ownership of fund share or through
her annual fees. Aragon and Nanda (2012) empirically analyze the relationship between
risk shifting by a hedge fund manager and the manager’s incentive contract, personal capi-
tal stake, and the risk of fund closure. Other related empirical research include the work of
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). We are unaware,
however, of any existing model that both captures the managerial skill (alpha) and the con-
vex compensation in a hedge fund seeding business. Capturing these institutional features
in a model that is sufficiently tractable to evaluate the costs of these innovative swaps in
hedge fund seeding business is a main contribution of this study.
Chapter 3 is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents two models of hedge fund seeding
innovations and studies the impact of incentive contracts, managerial stake, and hedge fund
liquidation on managers’ risk shifting behavior; Section 3.3 discusses the quantitative results
of our model; and Section 3.4 presents our conclusions. The equilibrium price of contingent
claims, such as fees and investors’ payoff can be found in the Appendix B.
7See, for example, Ross (2004), Panageas and Westerfield (2009) Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Lan, Wang,
and Yang (2013) among others.
38
Chapter 3. Hedge Fund Seeding Innovation with Fees-for-seed and Fees-for-guarantee
Swaps
3.2 Modeling hedge fund seeding innovation
Similar to Yang and Zhang (2013)’s paper which focuses on the borrowing constraints of an
entrepreneur, Chapter 3 assumes that the financing constraint faced by ESF managers will
be largely alleviated by introducing the fees-for-guarantee swap supported by a commercial
guarantee company or an insurer.
In this section we first specify the hedge fund dynamics and present a benchmark model
with only fees-for-seed swap which is popular in the hedge fund seeding industry. Then we
develop a dynamic framework to model the hedge fund seeding innovation with both the
fees-for-seed and fees-for-guarantee swaps and explain why the fees-for-guarantee swap
is beneficial to both an ESFs manager and a seeder. Last, we turn to the breakeven alpha
strategy of the hedge fund seeding business.
3.2.1 Hedge fund dynamics and valuation
Dynamics of the asset under management As usual, we assume the cumulative-return
process R of the diversified market portfolio satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, t ≥ 0, (3.1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants. We denote by S the value process of the asset under
management (AUM, henceforth) and byH the current high-water mark (HWM, henceforth)
which is the highest level that the AUM has reached subject to certain adjustments. We
assume for t ≥ 0 that
dSt
St
= (µ− ω −m)dt+ ρσdBt +
√
1− ρ2σdZt, S0 given, St < Ht, (3.2)
where ω is the regular withdrawal rate, m is the management fee rate, and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the
correlation coefficient between the hedge fund and the market. A higher absolute value of
the correlation coefficient |ρ| means a less idiosyncratic risk faced by ESFs managers: The
values ρσ, and  ≡
√
1− ρ2σ are the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of AUM respec-
tively. All sources of uncertainty arise from two independent standard Brownian Motions
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B and Z defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P), where {Ft : t ≥ 0}
describes the flow of information available to investors.
Management compensation contracts ESFs managers who run the fund are paid via both
annual and incentive fees. The annual fees are specified as a constant fraction m of the net
asset value while the incentive fees are commonly accompanied by the HWM provision. We
denote by H the HWM process. If H is higher than the value of AUM, it evolves determin-
istically according to
dHt = (g − ω −m′)Htdt, (3.3)
where g is the rate of interest or an other contractually stated rate and m′ is the cost or fees
allocated to its reduction. If the asset value reaches a new high, the HWM is reset to this
higher level.
Hedge fund liquidation There are normally two possibilities for the hedge fund to be liq-
uidated. First, following Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), we assume the fund will
be liquidated with an exogenously given probability λ per unit of time. Such liquidation
time is donated by τ1. Second, an endogenous liquidation required by ordinary investors
may occur if the fund performance is sufficiently poor. In contrast to Grossman and Zhou
(1993) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) among others, who assume the liquidation threshold
is bHt, our liquidation threshold is a less value l ≡ b(1 − Φ)Ht, where Φ is the fraction of
AUM owned by the managers. The hitting time of the endogenous liquidation threshold is
denoted by τ2. Thus, unlike the existing literature, our model assumes a lower liquidation
boundary, due to the managers’ ownership of AUM under the arrangement of the innova-
tive contract. In view of this, the new financing scheme of hedge fund generates more profits
and leads to a significant welfare improvement8.
8A number of independent studies have concluded that on average, ESFs outperform more established funds
as being either smaller and nimbler, or hungrier for returns. Hedge Fund Research (HFR) found that over the
10-year period from 1994 to 2004, funds with less than a three-year track record outperformed older funds
by over 5% annually, with nearly identical volatility. Similarly, a 2009 study by PerTrac Financial Solutions
finds that younger and smaller funds have outperformed larger and older funds, over the long term. Other
studies, Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2013) and Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) made a number of adjustments to
raw performance data, to mitigate survivorship or backfill biases. Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) reached the
conclusion that managers generate abnormal (excess) performance of 2.3% during their first two years relative
to later years.
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In short, the fund is liquidated either exogenously at stopping time τ1 or endogenously
at τ2, depending on which comes first. Thus we define liquidation time τ ≡ min {τ1, τ2}.
Naturally, after liquidation, the managers receive nothing but his share ΦSτ of AUM.
The pricing of fees and the investor’s claim To determine a linear pricing rule we must
specify a martingale pricing operator, see Ingersoll (2006), or a state-price deflator, see e.g. Duffie
(2001).
We denote by η ≡ (µM − r)/σM the Sharpe ratio of the market. Following Goetzmann,
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), we define α ≡ µ− r − β(µM − r) ≡ µ− r − ρση as the premium
return of ESFs, which is considered as an excess return generated by the managers’ skills.
The risk-adjusted expected growth of the hedge fund underQ is then given by ν ≡ µ−ρση =
α+ r. Accordingly, the net asset value of the hedge fund follows
dSt
St
= (α+ r − ω −m)dt+ ρσdBQt + dZt, St < Ht, (3.4)
where Z and BQ defined by BQt ≡ Bt + ηt are Q−Brownian motion. Therefore, at any
current time t ≥ 0, according to (Equation ( 3.4), we get the present values of annual fee, the
performance fee and the investors’ claim respectively as follows:
A(St, Ht) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)cSsds
]
, (3.5)
P (St, Ht) = EQt
{∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)k[dHs − (g − ω −m′)Hsds]
}
, (3.6)
I(St, Ht) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ωSds+ e−r(τ−t)Sτ
]
. (3.7)
Thus, the value of the total management fees is given by
F (St, Ht) ≡ A(St, Ht) + P (St, Ht). (3.8)
All of them can be explicitly derived and for the computation details, please refer to the
Appendix B.
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3.2.2 A benchmark model of hedge fund seeding innovation
In order to reach the initial AUM target and cover organizational expenses, ESFs managers
usually seek help from seeders by swapping part of their fees with seed capital. Under the
arrangement of the fees-for-seed swap, the ESFs manager obtains the amount ΦS0 of seed
capital at the cost of the fraction ψ of her total fees. Thus, the manager’s total compensation
denoted by M˜V (St, Ht) is given by
M˜V (St, Ht) = (1− ψ)F (St, Ht) + ΦI(St, Ht), (3.9)
where the total fees F (St, Ht) and the investor payoff I(St, Ht) are defined in Equations
(B.11) and (B.13) respectively.
In view of the scarcity of seed capital, a seeder often has more bargaining power when
signing a swap contract. Thus in our model we assume that the fraction ψ is determined by
ψA(S0, S0) = ΦS0, (3.10)
where the annual feeA(S0, H0) is defined in Equation (B.14). In other words, only harvesting
the fraction ψ of the regular annual fees is enough for redeeming seed capital of the seeder,
and the extra return ψP (S0, S0) allocated to the seeder is due to her strong bargaining power.
Either the seeder may recognize this as a positive signal of gifted ESFs managers. Thus, the
fraction ψ, referred to as seed cost in the following text, is given by
ψ=
Φ(ω +m+ λ− α){θ2(1 + k)− 1− lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1 + k)− 1]}
m{θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}−(1+k)m(θ2−θ1)l1−θ1 +cklθ2−θ1−ck , (3.11)
where θ1 and θ2 are respectively the smaller and larger roots of a characteristic quadratic
equation defined in the Appendix B.
The seed cost in practice is determined via the thumb rules; however, it is endogenously
derived in our model. Interestingly, the relationship between fees-for-seed ratio and seed
capital is linear when there is no exogenous liquidation risk (l = 0)9, which is quite similar
to the thumb rules. Clearly, the realistic value S˜V (St, Ht) of the seeder’s claim is given by
S˜V (St, Ht) = ψF (St, Ht). (3.12)
9One can obtain the results without effort by substituting l = 0 into Equation (3.11).
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Finally, the total present value of hedge fund H˜FV (St, Ht) is the sum of the values of the
managerial compensation and the seeder’s and ordinary investors’ claim, i.e.
H˜FV (St, Ht) ≡ M˜V (St, Ht) + S˜V (St, Ht) + (1− Φ)I(St, Ht)
= F (St, Ht) + I(St, Ht),
(3.13)
which is similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) but has a major distinction in asset
structure.
3.2.3 Hedge fund seeding innovation with both fees-for-seed swap and fees-for-
guarantee swap
To attract sufficient capital a fees-for-guarantee swap is further introduced in our model. In
this swap, a seeder provides the prescribed amount of seed capital (i.e. ΦS0) to the manager
in exchange for the fraction ψ of the manager’s total fees. Once the hedge fund liquidates,
an insurer, instead of the manager, must pay the amount ΦS0 of cash to the seeder. As a
return for the guarantee, the insurer gets a fraction, denoted by ϕ, of the manager’s fees10.
Evidently, thanks to the guarantee scheme, the seeder is exposed to less risk and they
have therefore a stronger incentive to invest in the fund. As a matter of fact, many fund
managers do so to attract investors. Under the guarantee swap, the value MV (St, Ht) of the
manager’ compensation is changed as
MV (St, Ht) = (1− ψ − ϕ)F (St, Ht) + ΦI(St, Ht), (3.14)
since the manager must pay ϕF (St, Ht) more to an insurer. Naturally, the value GV (St, Ht)
of the insurer’s claim is
GV (St, Ht) = ϕF (St, Ht). (3.15)
Generally speaking, an insurer will sign a great many contracts of the swaps with many
hedge funds and accordingly, to an insurer, the idiosyncratic risk of an hedge fund will
be well-diversified. For this reason, we assume that the present value of insurer’s compen-
satory payment Vguar to a seeder is equal to the present value of the fraction of fees allocated
10 Unlike the traditional credit hypothecation, however, the hedge fund manager in the new credit guarantee
scheme must pay to the guarantee company a portion (ϕ) of her fees(including both management fees and
incentive fees) as guarantee costs instead of the regular guarantee fees.
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to the insurer which is GV (S0, S0), i.e.
Vguar ≡ GV (S0, S0). (3.16)
We assume that the seeder will redeem her seed capital once the fund is liquidated.
This assumption is straightforward as the seeder demands that her downside risk is well
controlled at the level of her initial investment if the fund is liquidated. At liquidation the
seeder will get nothing from the manager but redeem ΦS0 compensatory payment from the
insurer. Therefore, the value Vguar should satisfy
Vguar ≡ pb(b, s0)ΦS0, (3.17)
where pb(b, s0), the market value of a security that claims one unit of of account at the hitting
time τ(b) = inf{t ≥ 0 : st ≤ b}, is given by11
pb(b, s0) =
(s0
b
)θ1.
(3.19)
Now we denote ϕ as the guarantee costs. We can easily compute guarantee costs by
submitting Equations (3.16) and (3.17) into Equation (3.15):
ϕ =
pb(b, s0)ΦS0
F (S0, S0)
. (3.20)
Then we define the value of seeder’s return SV (St, Ht) by:
SV (St, Ht) = ψF (St, Ht) + pb(b, s0)ΦS0. (3.21)
Equation (3.21) states that the seeder’s payoff in the guarantee scheme is greater than the
baseline model by the amount of pb(b, s)ΦS0. The additional part is due to the bargaining
power of the seeder especially for the case of start-up hedge funds. In the guarantee scheme,
11One can find the computational details in Duffie (2001). Similar to Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012) and Song,
Yang, and Yang (2013) among others, we denote s as AUM/HWM ratio, i.e. s = S/H , an effective variable in
our model that is given by
dst
st
= (α+ r − ω −m)dt+ ρσdBt + dZt, st < 1. (3.18)
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the seeder will get her original investment back at fund liquidation instead of nothing in the
baseline model. This means the seeder controls her downside risk well at fund liquidation
in the guarantee scheme. Moreover, when the fund has good performance, she generates
remarkable benefits by sharing the“enhanced economics”, i.e. a portion of incentive fees.
In our innovative model with guarantee arrangements, the seeder does not have to worry
about the risk shifting behavior of the ESFs manager because the fees-for-seed swap contract
aligns the manager’s interest with hers completely.
Finally, the total present value of hedge fund HFV (St, Ht) is given by the sum of man-
agerial compensation, the seeder’s payoff and ordinary investors’ value:
HFV (St, Ht) ≡ MV (St, Ht) + SV (St, Ht) + (1− Φ)I(St, Ht)
= F (St, Ht) + I(St, Ht),
(3.22)
which is the same as in Equation ( 3.13). This is true because the insurer does in fact nothing
but forces the manager to put a part of his earnings aside for refunding the initial investment
of the seeder.
3.2.4 Breakeven alpha strategy
A important question for both the ESFs manager and ordinary investors is what is the min-
imum α should be generated by the manager who receives a given portion (k) of incentive
fees in order to make ordinary investors break even, i.e I(S, S) = S, when the contracts
commences as in (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross 2003). This question is the same as how
large a performance fee should be charged for a given level of performance. Using Equation
(B.13) to solve I(S, S) = S for k gives the maximum high water performance fee justified by
a particular α:
k(α) =
1− θ2 − (θ1 − θ2)l1−θ1 + (θ1 − 1)lθ2−θ1
θ2 − θ1lθ2−θ1 − θ2 − θ1l1−θ1 − (ω + λ)(1− lθ2−θ1)/(α−m) . (3.23)
Other than the breakeven alpha strategy case, it is not uncommon that investors either
make losses or collect surplus depending on whether they hire a more skilled manager than
the breakeven case or not. Therefore, it is quite essential for investors to access managers’
skill correctly.
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3.3 Quantitative Results
In this section we numerically analyze the impact of HWM, managerial stake, and the possi-
bility of fund liquidation on ESFs managers’ risk shifting behavior under the arrangements
of the innovative contracts, i.e. the fees-for-guarantee swap and the fees-for-seed swap. In
order to make a comparison, following Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Psillaki and
Daskalakis (2009) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) among others, our numerical examples
are based on the following annualized baseline parameter values: typical parameter values
r +m′ − g = 5 percent, k = 20 percent, m = 1.5 percent, ω + λ = 10 percent, fund volatility
σ = 20 percent, alpha skills α = 5 percent, and liquidation barrier l = 0.5, managerial stake
Φ = 10 percent thus the effective liquidation barrier b˜ ≡ l(1− Φ) = 0.45.
3.3.1 The seeder’s payoff and contract designing of fees-for-seed ratio
FIGURE 3.1: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the seeder’s claim. In this case the liquidation barrier l = 0.
The seeder’s return profile Under the arrangements of fees-for-guarantee swap and fees-
for-seed swap contracts, a seeder’s return potential is greater than that of ordinary investors
by sharing the “enhanced economics” and her downside risk is transferred to an insurer.
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As discussed in Section 3.2, the seeder’s return profile is guaranteed at the level (equaling
to her initial investment) once fund liquidation occurs. These innovative swaps effectively
align the interests of the seeder with those of the ESFs manager. In our model the seeder’s
payoff is similar to a hedge fund manager except for the case of fund liquidation.
FIGURE 3.2: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the ESFs manager’s total compensation. In this case the liquidation
barrier l = 0.5.
As indicated in Figure 3.1 12, the seeder’s payoff is an increasing function of volatility
and fund performance. By contrast, Figure 3.2 shows a completely different type of value
function. Specifically, the seeder’s payoff gets worse for even a better performance of the
hedge fund with significantly high risk. At first glimpse it seems beyond belief, however,
the reason is quite simple that extremely high level of risk outweighs the benefit from the
fund’s performance. Therefore, the seeder prefers a liquidation to redeem her investment
than struggling in mud. Moreover, the seeder’s value near the HWM has a slightly rise to
reaches its maximum (top at almost 13%) and then follows a dramatic fall. The intuition
is straightforward because the risk of endogenous liquidation moderates the seeder’s risk
attitude as if she acts like a risk averse agent, which is in accordance with the results of
12The 3-D figures here in this chapter and in Chapter 4 are ploted by Matlab 2016a software and as the color
changes from light to dark (i.e. form green to yellow, then to red) the values increases.
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Panageas and Westerfield (2009). Moreover, both Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show the seeder obtains
great potential profits if the ESFs has good performances (15% and 13% at S/H = 1 for
l = 0 and 0.5 respectively) under an appropriate level of risk and she still collects her initial
investment at liquidation time, thus her downside risk is well controlled.
FIGURE 3.3: The impact of managerial stake Φ on the initial designing of fees-
for-seed swap ratio ψ with two different liquidation barriers. In this case, we
choose a higher volatility (σ = 30%) in order to highlight the liquidation effect.
Contract designing: fees-for-seed ratio Unlike traditional swaps whose value should be
zero at the commencement of the swap for both the seeder and the manager, the seeder
in our innovative model obtains additional ψ fraction of performance fees because she has
greater bargaining power than ESFs managers, who desperate for money. As Goetzmann,
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) states,“In particular, if investment capital is a scarce resource rel-
ative to potential hedge fund managers, virtually all benefits of the hedge funds may go to
the investors”. Our numerical results back up the above statements: a manager with lower
alpha skills (α = 3%) have to give up all her performance fees to a seeder to swap the seed
capital equaling to 14% ownership of the fund. However, to attract the same amount of
seed capital, a much more skilled manager (α = 8%) gives up only 60% of her performance
fees, as indicated in Figure 3.3. Both Figure 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that a manager has to give
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FIGURE 3.4: The impact of managerial stake Φ on the initial designing of fees-
for-seed swap ratio ψ with three different levels of manager skills. Similar to
Fig.3, fund volatilityσ is 30%.
up a larger fraction of her performance fees to exchange a greater amount of seed capital,
as we expect. Interestingly, most of our numerical results from Figure 3.3 and 3.4 reveal the
nonlinear relationship between the fees-for-seed ration and managerial stake except the case
when ESFs managers face no endogenous liquidation risks. The rationale is that managerial
stake has nonlinear effects of ψ in our model through affecting the liquidation barrier and
these effects disappear once the liquidation b is zero.
3.3.2 The insurer’s claim, i.e. guarantee costs ϕ
Generally speaking, an insurer will sign a great many contracts for the swaps with many
ESFs managers and accordingly, to an insurer, the idiosyncratic risk of a hedge fund will
be well-diversified. Figure 3.5 shows that as the increase of the fund risk, the guarantee
costs increases, as we expect. These observations accord with economic intuition since a
manager with better skills generates more fees and profits. For the case α = 5%, as the
fund risk increases from 10% to 30% the guarantee costs rises up slowly form naught to 5%.
Interestingly, the guarantee costs experiences a remarkable rise from 4% to 26% in the case
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FIGURE 3.5: The impact of fund risk σ on the value of guarantee costs ϕ with
three different values of alpha skills.
α = −5%, as the fund volatility rises from 10% to 30%.
In addition, we present illusive results on how fund liquidation barrier influences the
guarantee costs. As shown in Figure 3.6, the guarantee costs of a higher liquidation barrier
(l = 0.8%) is almost ten times bigger than that of fund with a lower barrier (l = 0.5%) for
the case that the fund volatility is high at 30%. The rationale is that a higher liquidation
barrier gives a higher probability of fund liquidation, thus the increase of the probability
of an insurer’s compensatory payment by who thus a greater guarantee costs is demanded.
However, as fund risk decreases the cost gap is not noticeably because in the case of lower
fund risk the probability of fund liquidation is very small even for a higher liquidation
barrier. Interestingly, if the liquidation barrier is naught, then there is no need for an insurer
in our scheme as the hedge fund will never be liquidated which is not the case in reality.
3.3.3 Risk shifting behavior of ESFs managers at the stage hedge fund seeding
The effect of liquidation barrier Similar to Carpenter (2000), it is optimal for ESFs man-
agers who is compensated through an asymmetric bonus fee and faces no explicit downside
risks to take extreme risks when she is further away from the money.
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FIGURE 3.6: The impact of fund risk σ on the value of guarantee costs ϕ with
three different values of liquidation barrier.
FIGURE 3.7: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the ESFs manager’s total compensation when the manager faces no
downside risk, i.e. liquidation barrier l = 0.
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FIGURE 3.8: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the ESFs manager’s total compensation. In this case the liquidation
barrier l = 0.8.
The risk taking behavior in our model is illustrated in Figure 3.7: the total compensation
value of the ESFs manager is always an increasing function of fund volatility, whether the
fund is likely to liquidate or not, which means the ESFs manager has great incentive to
shift risk. By contrast, risk shifting behavior is completely cubed when the ESFs manager
faces explicit downside risk, as is shown in Figure 3.8. This result is generally consistent
with Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) and Aragon and
Nanda (2012). When the fund is likely to liquidate and as the fund volatility increases the
performance fees value rises while the manager’s annual fees and her managerial stake
value decrease. As the loss effect of annual fees and ownership value outweigh the risk
shifting benefits from the HWM, thus risk shifting behavior leading to a lower value of the
total compensation.
Our model suggests that optimal contract designing not only moderate risk shifting fol-
lowing poor performance, but also give managers incentive to chasing profits. As is illus-
trated in Figure 3.9, the manager will choose low volatility in order to dramatically reduce
the chance of hitting the liquidation boundary. However, the manager’s optimal strategy is
to increase risk slightly when the AUM is near its HWM. The intuition is quite simple: the
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FIGURE 3.9: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the ESFs manager’s total compensation. In this case the manager’s
ownership is Φ = 10%.
FIGURE 3.10: The impact of fund performance S/H , fund volatility σ on the
value of the ESFs manager’s total compensation. In this case the manager’s
ownership is Φ = 0%.
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manager will take gambles to collect the huge profits once AUM reaches the HWM. How-
ever, the ESFs manager who faces liquidation constraints does not take extreme risks in our
model when AUM is near its HWM because performance fees, as shown in Fig 3.2.
The effect of the managerial stake Now we turn to analyze the impact of managerial stake
on a manager’s incentive to shift risk. Generally speaking, an ESFs manager will not take
great gambles following poor fund performance when having their own investment in the
fund (See e.g. Carpenter (2000), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007) and Aragon and Nanda (2012) among others.). Our numerical results show that the
managerial stake is effective in moderating the ESFs manager’s incentive to shift risk when
the fund is likely to liquidate endogenously.
As Figure 3.10 shows, the manager who has no ownership of fund share has a small
increase of 8% in total compensation value, as she lowers the fund volatility from 30 percent
to 10 percent when AUM is near the liquidation barrier (x → 0.5). On the contrary, the
total compensation value experience a bigger increase of nearly 14%, and in this case the
liquidation boundary is 10% lower than that of the case without a managerial stake. The
illusive results show that the manager who has her own investment in will largely improve
her welfare when AUM near the initial liquidation barrier (l = 0.5) by decreasing the fund
volatility dramatically, thus mitigating the manager’s risk shifting behavior.
3.3.4 The breakeven α strategy
Finally, we show illustrative results on how α is important both for managers and investors.
As shown in Figure 3.11 and 3.12, the ESFs manager should have much better managerial
skills to justify a higher performance fee13. More specifically, Figure 11 indicates that the
minimum α required for three different volatility (σ = 10%, 20% and 30%) to justify a per-
formance fee rate (e.g. the most usual case i.e. k = 20%) is 270 and 330 and 450 basis points
respectively. Now we turn to analyze the effect of the exogenous liquidation barrier on the
justified performance fee rate. For a given performance fee rate, the required excess return
is 390 and 450 basis points for two different liquidation barrier (l = 0, 0.5). The intuition is
simple, a lower liquidation barrier contributes to higher values for investors, thus a smaller
13In this case, we choose a higher volatility (σ = 30%) in order to highlight the liquidation effect.
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FIGURE 3.11: The maximum performance fee k rate for different managerial
skills α with three levels of fund volatility.
FIGURE 3.12: The sensitivity of the maximum performance fee k rate with
respect to correlation coefficient ρ at two different levels of liquidation barrier.
alpha is required. Interestingly, our numerical results reveal that charging a positive per-
formance fee is never justified for an ESFs manager who generates a α less than 150 basis
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points regardless of different values of fund volatility and liquidation barriers.
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3.4 Conclusion
Chapter 3 deals with the pricing of seed costs and the risk shifting behavior of an ESFs
manager who signs new three party agreements, here called the fees-for-guarantee swap
and the fees-for-seed swap, with a seeder and an insurer. The main conclusions are detailed
explicitly while numerical examples are provided.
We find that the seeder in the case with both the fees-for-guarantee swap and fees-for-
seed swap faces less uncertainty, due to the guarantee than the case only with fees-for-seed
swap in practice. This intuition is simple as the seeder still gets her initial investment from
the insurer at the termination of the hedge fund. Thanks to fees-for-guarantee swap and
fees-for-seed swap, the seeder not only controls her downside risk well, but also has re-
markable potential profits by sharing the “enhanced economics” if ESFs has a good perfor-
mance. Under the arrangements of fees-for-guarantee swap and fees-for-seed swap con-
tracts, a seeder’s return potential is greater than that of ordinary investors by sharing the
“enhanced economics” and her downside risk is transferred to the insurer. In our model,
the seeder’s return profile is guaranteed at level (equaling to her initial investment) even
when fund liquidation occurs. These innovative swaps effectively align the interests of the
seeder with those of the ESFs manager. Interestingly, the seeder’s payoff in our model is
similar to a hedge fund manager who only charges the incentive fees to manage the fund.
Unlike traditional swaps whose value should be zero at the commencement of the swap for
both the seeder and the manager, the seeder in our innovative model obtains additional ψ
fraction of performance fees because she has greater bargaining power than that of ESFs
managers who desperate for money.
Closed-form solution of fees-for-seed ratio is derived in our model, which follows de-
tailed numerical examples. The greater the seed capital obtained, the more fees the manager
should give up, as we expect. Surprisingly, our quantitative results reveal the nonlinear
relationship between the fees-for-seed ration and managerial stake, which is different from
the ”thumb rule” in practice except the case when ESFs managers face no endogenous liqui-
dation risks. In addition, when a hedge fund whose AUM near its endogenous barrier, the
guarantee costs rises as the fund volatility increases since a higher volatility increases the
probability of compensatory payment of an insurer by who, thus a greater guarantee costs
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is demanded.
Interestingly, our numerical results reveal that charging a positive performance fee is
never justified for an ESFs manager who generates an α less than 150 basis points regardless
of different values of fund volatility and liquidation barriers. Other than the breakeven
alpha strategy case, it is not uncommon that investors either make losses or collect surplus
depending on whether they hire a more skilled manager than the breakeven case or not.
Therefore, it is quite essential for investors to access managers’ skill correctly.
At last, our model suggests that optimal contract designing, i.e. the determination of
swap ratios e.g. ψ and ϕ not only moderate risk shifting following poor performance, but
also give managers incentive to chasing profits. More specifically, managerial stake is ef-
fective in moderating the ESFs manager’s incentive to shift risk when the fund is likely to
liquidate endogenously.
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Chapter 4
Hedge Fund Seeding via Fees-for-Seed
Swaps under Idiosyncratic Risk
Coauthored with Christian Ewald 1
Abstract
We develop a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business by solving the consump-
tion and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager who launches a hedge fund through a
seeding vehicle. This vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap, specifies that a strategic partner (seeder) pro-
vides a critical amount of capital in exchange for participation in the funds revenue. Our results
indicate that the new swap not only solves the serious problem of widespread financing constraints
for new and early-stage funds (ESFs) managers, but can be highly beneficial to both the manager and
the seeder if structured properly.
1Professor Christian Ewald is head of Economics at Adam Smith Business School, Univeristy of Glasgow
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4.1 Introduction
There has been a significant increase in both the number of hedge fund seeders and the
amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding since the aftermath of 2008’s market
upheaval.2 However, there still remains a tremendous shortage of capital for new and
early-stage funds (ESFs). This is mainly because most capital providers or institutional
investors increasingly focus on larger established hedge funds whose assets under man-
agement (AUM) are usually larger than 1 billion and who are considered highly credible.
Additionally a larger talent pool of ESFs managers is now competing for the scarce avail-
able seed capital. Worse still, barriers to entry for ESFs are much higher today than in the
period before the 2008 financial crisis.3
Therefore, navigating the terrain to a successful launch of a hedge fund has become more
difficult and the financing constraint faced by ESFs managers nowadays is much more seri-
ous than before. In order to reach the initial AUM target and cover organizational expenses,
more and more ESFs managers are likely to turn to seed investors for early stage of capital
through a seeding vehicle. This is an arrangement to which we refer as fees-for-seed swap
that specifies that a seed investor (or seeder) commonly commits to providing a remark-
able amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an “anchor investor” in a new fund in
exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually the fees that the ESFs man-
ager generates from the entire pool of assets in the fund. If structured properly, the seeding
approach can be highly beneficial to the ESFs manager and to investors who provide the
seed capital. It is not uncommon that the hedge fund seeder receives a portion of the hedge
fund’s revenue stream to get greater return potential than an ordinary investor.
In general a seeder can expect about 1% of revenues for each $1 million of seed capital
for seed transactions no larger than $50 million. However, seed arrangements can vary
substantially based on factors such as the experience of the manager, the alpha record, the
amount of seed capital provided, the withdrawal and lock-up period terms, and the relative
2HFM-Week research reported in November 2011 that seeders had approximately $4.6 billion in available
capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
3The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Title IV) compels the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose reporting requirements on all hedge funds as it deems necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the assessment of systemic risk. According to “Launch bad; Hedge
funds” (The Economist 20 Apr. 2013: 79), it is much harder now to break into the hedge-fund business than it
used to be because of the rising expenses, more risk-averse investors and enhanced regulation.
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negotiating power of each party.4
While the seed investor will often demand the flexibility to redeem her5 investment as
soon as possible, the manager needs (and should require) the seed capital to remain invested
for a period sufficient to set its strategy, create a track record, and procure other investors.
Generally, during the lock-up period, the seed investor should be prohibited from redeem-
ing the investment if, in the reasonable judgment of the manager, doing so could adversely
affect the interests of the other investors in the fund.6
The ordinary investors may withdraw capital if the fund shows poor performance. For
simplicity , we assume that the withdrawal rate is constant. This is a common assumption in
the hedge fund literature and has been employed by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003)
and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013). Also, depending on the terms of the deal, the seeder will
generally commit to keep the investment in the fund for a defined lock-up period, typically
two to four years. It makes sense to assume that during this initial phase, idiosyncratic risks
take a more pronounced role as compared to later stages in the fund’s life, possibly due to
ordinary investors entering (or leaving) the fund and/or the fund manager experimenting
with different asset classes in order to set up a successful strategy. As seed commitments
expire, AUM will be divided among the ordinary investors, the seeder, and the ESFs man-
ager according to a ”waterfall” schedule.7 After the initial seeding stage, the fund becomes
more stable and in our idealized setup we assume that the ESFs manager no longer bears
any idiosyncratic risk after the lock-up period has been completed. Therefore, we can apply
Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross’ (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003)) model to calculate the
market value of the fund at termination of the lock-up period. While the manager’s perfor-
mance incentives during the lock-up period are implemented through a waterfall schedule,
performance incentives after the lock-up period are provided by a high-water-mark (HWM)
incentive, compare Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003).
As there is no publicly available data on the historical performance of seeding strategies,
4Source form Larch Lane Advisors: Hedge Fund Seeding: A Compelling Alternative.
5Rather than using the gender neutral “she/he” and “her/his” we have chosen for simplicity to simply use
the pronouns “she” and “her” throughout the manuscript.
6Infrequently, a seeder may identify certain conditions under which it will be permitted to redeem invest-
ment, prior to the lock-up period, such as in the event of poor fund performance, management attrition, sale or
transfer of control of the management entity, criminal convictions or regulatory violations and material breaches
of the investment parameters or provisions of the seed investment agreement.
7See details in the next Section.
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there are only very few simple models in practice focusing on hedge fund seeding return,
volatility and liquidity profile.8 To our knowledge, Chapter 4 provides the first dynamic
framework on valuation of the hedge fund seeding business by solving the portfolio-choice
problem for a risk-averse manager.
Several other studies evaluate the performance of hedge funds focusing on different as-
pects. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) provide the first quantitative inter-temporal
valuation framework of investors’ payoff and managers’ fees in a setting where the fund’s
value follows a log-normal process and the fund managers have no discretion over the
choice of portfolio. Carpenter (2000) shows that it is optimal for hedge fund managers who
face no explicit downside risk to choose infinite volatility as asset value goes to zero. This
behavior is referred to as risk-shifting. Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Hodder and Jack-
werth (2007) and Aragon and Nanda (2012) argue though that a manager’s convex payoff
structure does not necessarily induce risk shifting when the fund shows poor performance
as long as the manager is exposed to downside risk, either through her ownership of fund
share or through her annual fees. Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and Lan, Wang, and Yang
(2013) analyze the impact of management fees and high-water mark based incentive fee on
leverage and valuation. None of these studies, however, model the hedge fund seeding in-
novation in the context of the ESFs manager’s portfolio choice problem, and hence they do
not assess the costs of illiquidity and unspanned risk of hedge fund seeding investments.
Our article also relates to the literature about valuation and portfolio choice with illiq-
uid assets, such as restricted stocks, executive compensation, illiquid entrepreneurial busi-
nesses, and private equity (PE) investments. For example, Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003)
analyze a continuous-time portfolio choice model with restricted stocks. Both Chen, Miao,
and Wang (2010) and Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012) study entrepreneurial firms with un-
spanned idiosyncratic risks under incomplete markets. For PE investments, Sorensen, Wang,
and Yang (2014) develop a dynamic valuation model of PE investments by solving the
portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor, who invests in a private equity fund,
managed by a general partner. We are unaware, though, of any existing models that cap-
ture the illiquidity, managerial skill (alpha), risk attitude and compensation of the hedge
fund seeding business. Capturing these important features in a model that is sufficiently
8Larch Lane Advisors LLC constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows for a seeded fund
featuring an innovative seeding strategy.
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tractable to determine the subjective value of fees in the hedge fund seeding business is one
of the main contributions of this study.
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a dynamic valuation framework
for modeling hedge fund seeding innovation and the impact of incentive contracts, man-
agerial stake and hedge fund liquidation on a risk-averse ESFs manager’s consumption and
portfolio-choice behavior. A solution for this model is derived in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5 discuss numerical results for breakeven alphas, seed costs and subjective value
of management compensation. The main conclusions are summarized in Section 4.6. The
appendix provides detailed computations relating to the market value of the hedge fund
after the initial seeding stage.
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4.2 Model Setup
4.2.1 Hedge fund seeding investment opportunities
We consider an infinitely-lived risk-averse ESFs manager who has the opportunity to launch
a take-it-or-leave-it hedge fund at present time 0, which requires to raise the target AUM S0.
All sources of uncertainty arise from two independent standard Brownian motions B and
Z defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P), where F ≡ {Ft : t ≥ 0}
describes the flow of information available to the seeder.
In addition to the opportunity of launching a fund, the manager has access to standard
financial investment opportunities, see Merton (1971). Let Wt denote the ESFs manager’s
liquid (financial) wealth process. At any time t ≥ 0 the manager invests an amount of Πt in
a diversified market portfolio and the remaining amount Wt −Πt in the risk-free asset with
a constant interest rate r. The return of the diversified market portfolio is denoted by R and
satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, (4.1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants, and η ≡ (µM − r)/σM is the Sharpe ratio of the market
portfolio.
We assume that AUM of the hedge fund {St : t ≥ 0} follows a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM):
dSt
St
= (µ− ω −m)dt+ ρσdBt +
√
1− ρ2σdZt, S0 ≡ S given, (4.2)
where µ, ω,m and σ are constants; µ is the expected growth rate, ωS is the regular with-
drawals or distribution among investors, mS is the management fee continuously occurring
at the rate mS9, σ is the total volatility of hedge fund growth and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the corre-
lation coefficient between the hedge fund and the return on the market portfolio given by
Equation ( 4.1).10 The parameters ζ ≡ ρσ and  ≡
√
1− ρ2σ are respectively the systematic
9Hedge fund managers normally receive 20% of the increase in fund value in excess of the last recorded
maximum, i.e. high-water-mark (henceforth, HWM) as incentive fee in addition to 2% of AUM as annual fees,
a compensation structure often referred to as two-twenty and considered as the industry standard. Several
academic articles study the characteristics of hedge fund fees, such as Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh
(1999)), andAragon and Nanda (2012).
10Unlike the standard literature which uses a HWM incentive structure throughout the whole lifetime of the
fund, our model assumes a two-to-twenty rule under which the ESFs manager obtains incentive fees at the end
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and idiosyncratic volatility of the hedge fund. Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross
(2003), we define α ≡ µ−r−β(µM −r) ≡ µ−r−ρ σσM (µM −r) ≡ µ−r−ρση as the premium
return on ESFs, i.e. the managers’ skills in CAPM context.11
The Brownian motions B and Z provide the sources of market risk (systematic) and id-
iosyncratic risk of the hedge fund, respectively. A higher absolute value |ρ| of the correlation
coefficient implies that the systematic volatility has a larger weight, ceteris paribus.
4.2.2 Seeding innovation with fees-for-seed swap
Since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tremendous shortage of
capital available to ESFs. Investors have learnt their lessons from the financial crisis and be-
come smarter and more cautious about their investments. This has tightened the financing
constraints of hedge fund managers even further. According to the Seward & Kissel New
Hedge Fund Study (2014), 65% of funds within the Study obtained some form of founders
capital (significantly higher than the 43% in the 2013 study). Moreover, based on conversa-
tions with various industry participants, the study estimates, that within the entire hedge
fund industry for the calendar year 2014, at least 40% of all launches greater than $75 million
(and an estimated 15% of all fund launches) had some form of seed capital.
In order to attract sufficient capital to cover organizational expenses and be considered
credible, hedge fund managers may seek a strategic partner or a seeder who provides a criti-
cal amount of seed capital ΦS0 in exchange for economic participation in the funds revenue,
i.e. a proportion ψ of the manager’s fees including both management fee and performance
fees in the seeding stage.
4.2.3 Waterfall schedule upon the expiration of seed investments
At the end of the lock-up period at time T , AUM ST will be divided among the ordinary
investors, the seeder, and the manager according to a so-called “waterfall” schedule, similar
as in Sorensen, Wang, and Yang (2014). More specifically, let y denote the hurdle rate during
of the lock-up period through a waterfall schedule only, and then for the remaining lifetime of the fund obtains
incentive fees through a HWM rule.
11According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) the 10-year period between 1994 and 2004 saw funds with less
than a three-year track record outperform older funds by over 5% annually, with nearly identical volatility.
Other studies, Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2013) and Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) made a number of adjustments
to raw performance data to mitigate survivorship or backfill biases.
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the lock-up period for the ordinary investors, whose maximum payment at maturity T in
consequence is:
Z0 = (1− Φ)S0eyT . (4.3)
Any remaining proceeds after deducting the ordinary investors’ share, Z0, and returning
the seed capital with preferred hurdle rate h, i.e. ΦS0ehT , constitute the profits of the ESFs,
given by:
ST − Z1, (4.4)
where Z1 ≡ Z0 + ΦS0ehT is the upper boundary that equals to the sum of the maximum
payment to the ordinary investors and the preferred return for the seeder. These profits
are divided between the ordinary investors and the ESFs manager. The manager receives
her carried interest, while the ordinary investor’s share along with his maximum payments
remain in AUM after the seeding stage. Therefore, there are three regions of the waterfall
structure, depending on the amount of AUM at the end of the lock-up period.
Region 1: Hurdle rate for the ordinary investors (ST ≤ Z0) In our model, the ordinary
investors’ payoffs is senior to the seeder’s investment, thus the seeder and the manager re-
ceive nothing if ST falls below the boundary of Z0. The guaranteed payment to the ordinary
investors is given by:
OP1(AT , T ) = min{ST , Z0}. (4.5)
Region 2: Preferred return (Z0 ≤ ST ≤ Z1) At the upper boundary of this region, the
seeder gets her seed capital back with a prescribed hurdle rate h, ΦS0ehT , and the seeder’s
payoff in this region, at maturity T , is:
SP (ST , T ) = max{ST − Z0, 0} −max{ST − Z1, 0}. (4.6)
Region 3: The ESFs manager’s carried interest (ST > Z1) After deducting the guaran-
teed payment and preferred return of the seed capital, the ESFs manager claims her carried
interest, the fraction k of the profits ST − Z1, given by:
GP (ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (4.7)
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Denote OP3(ST , T ) as the ordinary investors’ share in this region which is given by:
OP3(ST , T ) = (1− k) ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (4.8)
One can easily compute the sum of the payoffs of all agents, at maturity T , which satis-
fies:
OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ) + SP (ST , T ) +GP (ST , T ) = ST . (4.9)
After returning the seed capital, only the ordinary investors’ payoff remains in the fund,
and the adjusted AUM S∗T is:
S∗T ≡ OP (AT , T ) = OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ). (4.10)
Therefore, the ordinary investors’ claim at maturity T , denoted by OP ∗(AT , T ), satisfies:
OP ∗(AT , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), (4.11)
where I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), the investors’ claim in the Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross model, is determined
by Equation ( C.11) in Appendix C. Appendix C presents more details about the market
value of the ordinary investors’ claim after the seeding stage.
4.2.4 The manager’s problem
The ESFs manager’s standard time separable preference is characterized by her initial wealth
W0 and a pure subjective discount rate δ, and her utility function U(C), represented by:
max
cs
E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−δs)U(cs)ds
]
. (4.12)
For tractability, we assume the manager has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
utility preference, given by
U(c) = − exp(−γc)/γ, (4.13)
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The overall time horizon [0,∞)
entails the lock-up period [0, T ] during which the manager faces idiosyncratic risk (possibly
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due to assets in the fund being less liquid and proprietary) as well as the remaining period
[T,∞), during which it is assumed that the underlying risks are fully spanned by public
assets, as in Sorensen, Wang, and Yang (2014) section 3.12
4.2.5 Manager’s liquid wealth dynamics
During the lock-up period, the manager’s financial wealth evolves according to,
dWt = (rWt + (1− ψ)mS − ct)dt+ Πt((µM − r)dt+ σMdBt), 0 < t < T. (4.14)
The first term in Equation (4.14) is the wealth accumulation when the manager fully invests
in the risk free asset, plus the revenue of managing the ESFs net of her consumption. The
second term is the excess return from the manager’s investment in the market portfolio.
At the end of the lock-up period T , the manager’s wealth (including current portfolio
wealth and futures management fees) jumps from WT− to WT , with
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(4.15)
The second term on the right hand side of Equation (4.15) represents the carried interest
of the hedge fund seeding business. The term F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) consists of the market value of
future fees paid to the manager after the lock-up period. Per assumption, the risk to which
the fund is exposed after the lock-up period is fully spanned by public assets, as such the
market value of the fees can be computed under the appropriate risk neutral measure as
in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003). An explicit expression for F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) is provided
in Equation (C.12) in Appendix C. The dynamic programming principle and the fact that
we have full spanning over the period [T,∞) implies that the solution of problem (12) can
now been obtained from the solution of the corresponding problem starting at time T with
wealth dynamics
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r)− ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt, (4.16)
12This is an idealization of the fact that idiosyncratic risks in the start up of the fund and in particular during
the lock-up period are significantly higher than when the fund has established itself.
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and initial wealth WT according to (15), and then by backward induction over the interval
[0, T ] as in the following section.
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4.3 Model Solution
In this section, we first derive seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps for the ESFs manager and
the breakeven alpha for the ordinary investors. Then we analyze the manager’s consump-
tion and portfolio choice in a dynamic valuation model taking account of illiquidity, ESFs
managers’ value-adding skills (alpha), incentive compensation, and the fees-for-seed swap.
However, the idiosyncratic risk which is present in the hedge funds seeding business inval-
idates the standard two-step complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) analysis (first value maxi-
mization and then optimal consumption allocation)13 due to the non-separability between
value maximization and consumption smoothing. In order to derive the solution, we first
solve the standard Merton consumption and portfolio choice problem faced by the manager
after the expiration of the lock-up period, similar as in Merton (1971) and Goetzmann, In-
gersoll, and Ross (2003). Following this, we solve an optimal control problem maximizing
the ESFs manager’s utility during the seeding stage.
4.3.1 Market value of total fees and call options on the seeding investment
We assume that the market prices cash-flows attached to liquid assets by using a risk neu-
tral measure Q equivalent to the measure P when restricted to all Ft for any t ≥ 0.14 The
corresponding state-price deflator pi satisfies dpi = −rpidt − ηpidZ, pi0 = 1 and restricted to
(Ω,Ft), we have λt = dQdP
∣∣∣
Ft
and λt = exp(rt) pitpi0 , see Duffie (2001).
Denote by ν ≡ µ−ω−m−ρση ≡ α+ r−ω−m the risk-adjusted drift rate of AUM, and
BQt a standard Brownian motion satisfying dB
Q
t = dBt + ηdt. Then under Q, the dynamics
of AUM in Equation ( 4.2) can be rewritten as
dSt
St
= νdt+ ρσdBQt + dZt. (4.17)
Let G∗(St, t) be the market value of the claim underlying St with a payment flow mSs
for s ∈ [t, T ] and a terminal payoff G∗(ST , T ) ≡ k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0} + F (S∗T , S∗T ) . Accord-
ing to the dynamic asset pricing theory (Duffie (2001)), it can be written as a conditional
13See more details in C and Huang (1989)
14Such a measure may not be unique due to incompleteness, but we assume here that the market has chosen
a risk neutral measure, which in consequence becomes the market measure.
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expectation under the risk-adjusted measure Q:
G∗(St, t) = EQt
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)mSsds+ e−r(T−t)G∗(ST , T )
]
. (4.18)
By using Ito’s formula, G∗(St, t) satisfies the follow PDE:
rG∗(St, t) = mS +G∗t + νStG
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V G
∗
SS(St, t), (4.19)
with two boundary conditions
G∗(0, t) = 0,
G∗(ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}+ F (S∗T , S∗T ),
(4.20)
where F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) is the market value of total fees generated after the lock-up period expires
at time T , given by Equation ( C.12) in the Appendix C.
Similar to Sorensen, Wang, and Yang (2014), the value at time t of a plain-vanilla Euro-
pean call option with strike price K and terminal payoff max{ST −K, 0} at T , denoted by
Call(St, t, α,K), is given by:
Call(St, t, α,K) = EQt
[
e−r(T−t) max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)EQt
[
e−ν(T−t) max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)
[
StN(d1)−Ke−ν(T−t)N(d2)
]
,
= Ste
(α−ω−m)(T−t)N(d1)−Ke−r(T−t)N(d2),
(4.21)
where
d1 = d2 + σ
√
T − t,
d2 =
ln(St/K)+(ν−σ2/2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t .
(4.22)
The pricing formula here is different from the classic Black-Scholes formula as we assume
that the investment of the hedge fund seeding business could generate excess alpha.
4.3.2 Seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps
Under the arrangement of a fees-for-seed swap during the hedge fund seeding stage, the
ESFs manager must give up a portion (ψ) of her fees in exchange for the seed capital (ΦS0).
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The cost ψ of the seed capital with fees-for-seed swap, is determined endogenously within
the model, in such a way that the value of the contract is zero at initiation.
Generally speaking, a seeder is usually a diversified investor who signs such contracts
with a large number of ESFs and therefore the idiosyncratic risk of the hedge fund seeding
business is well-diversified.15 Thus, the seed capital provided by the seeder must be equal
to the market value (equilibrium value) of the fees allocated to the seeder when the contract
commences. That is
ΦS0 = ψG
∗(S0, 0),
ψ = ΦS0G∗(S0,0) .
(4.23)
In addition to revenue sharing, seeding investments will be returned to seeders more
or less by SP (ST , T ) depending on the performance of the fund at the end of the lock-up
period. Using the pricing formula defined in the last subsection, one can derive an explicit
expression for SP (St, t), the time t value of this claim, that is
SP (St, t) = Call(St, t, α, Z0)− Call(St, t, α, Z1). (4.24)
Therefore, the time t value of the seeders’ claim, denoted by SP ∗(St, t), is given by:
SP ∗(St, t) = SP (St, t) + ψ ∗G∗(St, t). (4.25)
4.3.3 Break-even alpha
In Section 4.2, we considered the terminal payoffs (OP ∗(ST , T )) for the ordinary investors
at maturity T . Its present value, denoted by I∗(St, t), satisfies:
I∗(St, t) = EQt
[
e−r(T−t)I(S∗T , S
∗
T )
]
. (4.26)
By using Ito’s formula, we obtain the following PDE:
rI∗(St, t) = ωSt + I∗t + νStI
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V I
∗
SS(St, t), (4.27)
15For example, Larch Lane Advisors LLC (“Larch Lane”) , one of the first dedicated providers of hedge fund
seed capital, has seeded 25 hedge funds and continues to be an active capital provider for the hedge fund
industry.
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with the following two boundary conditions defined below:
I∗(ST , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ),
I∗(0, t) = 0.
(4.28)
In order to break-even at the start of the fund, the ordinary investors’ claim has to be
equal to their initial investment, i.e. I∗(S0, 0) = (1 − Φ)S0. Particularly, ordinary investors
benefit (suffer the loss) from their investment in the ESFs if I∗(S0, 0) ≥ (≤)(1 − Φ)S0 when
the contract commences. Using Equation ( 4.27) to solve I∗(S0, 0) = (1−Φ)S0 for α provides
the minimum alpha that should be generated by the ESFs manager for the ordinary investors
to break-even when the contract commences.
4.3.4 Consumption and portfolio choice after the lock-up period
As indicated in section 2.5, the manager’s investment problem after the lock-up period has
expired at time T is equivalent to the classical Merton problem studied in Merton (1971),
where the initial wealth WT consists of realized portfolio value prior to time T , waterfall
schedule payoff at time T and the market value of future management and performance
fees after time T . The optimal consumption and portfolio rule is therefore given by
c∗(W ) = r
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)
, (4.29)
Π∗ =
η
γrσM
, (4.30)
where W is the liquid wealth level.
The maximum of the expected utility of consumption after the seeding stage can be com-
puted as
Je(W ) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (4.31)
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4.3.5 Manager’s decisions and certainty equivalent valuation
Define Js(W,S, t) as the manager’s value function before the the end of the seeding stage,
i.e.
Js(W,S, t) = max
(cs,Πs)
E
[∫ T
t
exp (−δ(s− t))U(cs)ds+ e−δ(T−t)Je(WT )
∣∣∣∣Wt = W,St = S] ,
(4.32)
where W is the manager’s financial wealth process, and the function Je(·) is given by Equa-
tion ( 4.31). In light of section 2.5. the value function Js(W0, S0, 0) coincides with the value
of the problem (12). During the lock-up period, the manager’s financial wealth evolves
according to,
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r) + (1− ψ)mS − ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt, 0 < t < T, (4.33)
while as previously discussed, at the end of the lock-up period the wealth jumps to
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(4.34)
Compared to the exogenously given fraction of management fees retained by the seeder
in practice, the fraction ψ in our model is endogenously determined by the fees-for-seed
swap. In this case, the manager’s value function Js(W,S, t) satisfies the following Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation:
δJs(W,S, t) = sup
c≥0,Π
{U(c) + Jst + (rW + Π(µM − r) + (1− ψ)mS − c)JsW
+ 12(ΠσM )
2JsWW + ΠσMσρSJ
s
WS + µSJ
s
S +
1
2σ
2S2JsSS}.
(4.35)
The first-order conditions for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice are:
U ′(c) = JsW (W,S, t), (4.36)
Π(S, t) =
−JsW
JsWW
(
µM − r
σM 2
)
+
−JsWS
JsWW
ρσS
σM
. (4.37)
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According to the utility indifference pricing principle, the utility indifference price 16 of the
management fee owned by the ESFs manager in the seeding stage, denoted by G(S, t) 17 ,
satisfies
Js(W,S, t) = Je(W +G(S, t)) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (4.38)
Substituting Equations ( 4.36), (4.37), and (4.38) into Equation ( 4.35), we obtain the following
theorem immediately18:
Theorem 4.3.1. During the seeding stage for t ∈ [0, T ], the optimal consumption and portfolio rule
is given by
c∗(W,S, t) = r
[
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
]
, (4.39)
Π∗(S, t) =
η
γrσM
− ρσ
σM
SGS(S, t), (4.40)
where G(S, t) is the utility indifference price of the fees owned by the manager, which is the solution
of the following partial differential equation (PDE):
rG(S, t) = (1− ψ)mS +Gt + νSGS(S, t) + 1
2
σ2S2GSS(S, t)− γr
2
2S2GS(S, t)
2, (4.41)
subject to the following two boundary conditions:
G(ST , T ) = (1− Φ)[kGP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )] (4.42)
G(0, t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.43)
The first boundary condition states that, at maturity T , the ESFs manager collects her carried interest
plus the market fees paid by an outside manager. The second boundary condition reflects that the value
of the manager’s fees falls down to zero as the underlying AUM converges to zero during the lock-up
period.
16It is sometimes called certainty equivalent wealth, which is the risk-adjusted subjective value of managing
the hedge fund seeding business.
17Thanks to the exponential utility assumption, the utility indifference price is independent of the wealth level
of the fund manager.
18The proof here is the same as Theorem 2.3.1, one can find proof hints in Appendix A.
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Equations (4.39) and (4.40) indicate that the hedge fund manager will consume the im-
plied value G(S, t) and use the market portfolio to dynamically hedge the hedge fund seed-
ing business risk. More specifically, Equation (4.39) indicates that the manager’s consump-
tion is equal to the annuity value of the sum of financial wealth W and the implicit value of
the hedge fund seeding business G(S, t) plus two constant terms which appear in the clas-
sical Merton rule, see Merton (1971). The portfolio-choice rule is given by Equation (4.40)
in which the second term represents the manager’s hedging demand in the context of her
hedge fund seeding business. Equation (4.41) implies that if the absolute risk-aversion index
equals zero (i.e. the ESFs manager is risk-neutral towards the idiosyncratic risk), Equation
(4.41) becomes the standard equilibrium pricing equation. Therefore, the last term on the
right side of Equation (4.41) captures the idiosyncratic risk effect on the managers valuation
of the hedge fund business.
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4.4 Breakeven Alphas and Seed Costs
We have derived the solution of the fees-for-seed swap portion ψ referred to as the seed cost
and the subjective value of the ESFs manager’s compensation in Section 4.3 In this section
we provide some numerical results in order to develop more economic intuition. Baseline
breakeven parameters are chosen according to Sorensen, Wang, and Yang (2014). Table 4.1
summarizes the parameter values used in our baseline breakeven case.
TABLE 4.1: Summary of key parameters in baseline breakeven case
Parameter Symbol Value
Risk-free rate r 5%
Expected return of market portfolio µM 11%
Expected return of the ESFs µ
Volatility of market portfolio σM 20%
Volatility of the ESFs σ 25%
Market Sharpe ratio η 30%
Guaranteed yield y 5%
Hurdle rate h 8%
Management fee m 2%
Incentive fee k 20%
Lock-up period T 2
Managerial skills α
Subjective discount rate δ 5%
Idiosyncratic risk  23%
Seed capital ratio Φ 5%
Correlation coefficient ρ 40%
Exogenous liquidation barrier l 50%
Withdrawal rate, the liquidation parameter ω + λ 5%
Coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ 2
4.4.1 Breakeven alphas, compensation contracts, and seed capital involvement
How important is the managerial ability of producing superior performance (alpha)? In
order to develop more economic intuition, Table 4.2 presents breakeven alphas in different
compensation contracts for various levels of seed capitals. We first consider the case without
any fees, m = k = 0%. No positive alpha is then required by the ordinary investors for the
case of no seed capitals. Interestingly, the ordinary investors can even bear some loss if the
fund gets some seed capitals. For example, the ordinary investors’ investments breakeven
for a negative alpha, α = −0.77%, in the case that the seeder provides 15% of AUM seed
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capital as the anchor investor, which means the ordinary investors are more willing to invest
in the fund by following the seeders.
Moreover, some typical compensation contracts are compared in Table 4.2. Naturally,
increasing eitherm or k increases the breakeven alpha, for a given level of seed investments.
More specifically, holding the seed capital ratio fixed, increasing the management fee rate m
by 0.5 percentage-points results in an increase of the breakeven alpha by the same amount.
However, increasing k by 10 % increases the breakeven alpha by 0.55% to 0.75%, depending
on seed capital ratio.
Table 4.2 provides evidence that an ESFs manager would easily reach the target AUM
level to launch a fund via a seeding vehicle as the ordinary investors benefit from the
scheme. However, the ESFs manager backed up with seed capital has to give certain fraction
(ψ) of her fees revenues as compensation to the seeder, and we will analyze these seed costs
in the following subsection.
TABLE 4.2: The table gives breakeven alphas for different levels of seed capital ratio, Φ, incentive
fees k and management fees, m. Other parameters are β = 0.5, h = 8%, T = 2 years, and S0 = 100.
m k Φ = 0 Φ = 5% Φ = 10% Φ = 15%
0.0% 0% 0.00% -0.24% -0.50% -0.77%
1.5% 10% 2.14% 1.89% 1.62% 1.35%
1.5% 20% 2.79% 2.50% 2.22% 1.93%
1.5% 30% 3.54% 3.16% 2.83% 2.51%
2.0% 10% 2.65% 2.39% 2.12% 1.85%
2.0%a 20% 3.29% 3.00% 2.72% 2.43%
2.0% 30% 4.03% 3.66% 3.33% 3.01%
2.5% 10% 3.15% 2.89% 2.62% 2.35%
2.5% 20% 3.78% 3.50% 3.21% 2.93%
2.5% 30% 4.54% 4.16% 3.83% 3.51%
a Indicates the baseline breakeven case.
4.4.2 The seeder’s value and seed costs
We refer to the last section for the seeder’s value given by Equation (4.25). Not surprisingly,
the seeder’s value is significantly affected by the fund’s performance as the left hand sub-
figures in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicate. For example, the seeder’s value has more than
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FIGURE 4.1: The figure provides comparative statics for the seeder’s payoffs
with respect to time t and AUM S for different levels of seed capital.
FIGURE 4.2: The figure presents comparative statics for the seeder’s value
with respect to t and S, and seed costs ψ with respect to seed capital ratio for
three different levels of alpha.
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tripled as the fund AUM is doubled (from S0 = 100 to 200). On the other hand, the right
subfigure in Figure 4.1 shows that the seeder’s value is almost insensitive to time t, given
AUM fixed at 100. The seeder’s value changes only with time t near the maturity and AUM
staying around Z0 and Z1. This is mainly because the seeder’s positions in these options are
in the money when AUM goes to the interval around Z0 and Z1.
Unlike an ad-hoc ”rule of thumb” decision on the fees-for-seed ratio which is often com-
mon in practice, Chapter 4 provides a closed-form solution for the seed cost ψ which is
informed by a number of factors such as the amount of the seed capital, the manager’s al-
pha, the risk of the fund, etc. and takes account some key principles from Finance theory.
Interestingly, the right hand subfigure in Figure 4.2 shows that the fees-for-seed ratio ψ is
indeed a linearly increasing function of the seed capital which could be interpreted as a rule
of thumb in practice. However note that the slope of the function varies with parameters
such as the managerial skills. In details, the seeder demands more fund revenue share for
a manager with negative alpha (-1%) than that for a more talented manager (5%) and the
difference can be up to 40 % if providing 20 % of the initial AUM (S0).
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4.5 Seeding Investments with Lock-up Period, Subjective Value of
Fees, and Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section, we further analyze the effects of the lock-up period, seeding investment,
and idiosyncratic risk on management compensation, illiquidity discount, and the economic
value of the fund.
4.5.1 Lock-up period effects, illiquidity discount and management compensa-
tion
Table 4.3 presents valuations for the ordinary investors, the seeder, and the ESFs manager
for various levels of alpha. Panel A of Table 4.3, with a short lock-up period, shows that
the ordinary investors breakeven with α = 3.13%, while the seeder’s values for various
alphas outperform her initial seeding investment Φ ·S0 = 5. This is straightforward because
the seeder has an extra option value in addition to the breakeven swap when the seeding
contract commences. As the alpha decreases from 5% to -1% the seed cost ψ increases from
9.98% to 19.94 %, which makes sure the seeder breakeven at the beginning of the contract.
Due to the unspanned risk of the seeding business, the ESFs manager bears the illiquidity
costs. Similar to Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012), the illiquidity discount for the manager
is defined as the difference of the market value and the certainty-equivalent value of fees,
which is given by ID = G∗(S0, 0)−G(S0, 0). This discount is the amount the manager would
be willing to pay for not bearing the idiosyncratic risk during the initial seeding stage. As
we can see from Table 4.3, the amount of ID increases by 1.8 to 2.44 as increasing alpha from
-1% to 5%.
In Table 4.3, Panel B, with a relative long lock-up period T = 4 years, shows the illiquid-
ity discount is much greater than that in Panel A. For the case of α = 5%, the discount for
T = 4 around is six times of that in Panel A. This means the manager bears more illiquidity
discount for longer lock-up periods. Moreover, the seeder also suffers a loss for a long lock-
up period. For example, fixing α = −1%, the seeder suffers losses of 1.03 (around 20% of
her initial investment) by extending the lock-up period from 6 months to 4 years.
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TABLE 4.3: The table presents valuations of different agents’ claims with non-spanned risk for var-
ious levels of alpha. The columns refer to: the ordinary investors’ interest (I∗), the seeders’ payoffs
(SP ∗), the market value of fees (G∗), the economic value of the ESFs (V = I∗ + SP ∗ +G∗), the ESFs
manager’s certain-equivalent valuation (G), the illiquidity discount (ID = G∗ − G), and the seed
costs (ψ). Parameter values are γ = 2, S0 = 100, m = 2%, k = 20%, Φ = 5%, β = 0.5, and h = 8%.
Panel A and B report the results for the case with the lock-up periods T = 0.5 and T = 4, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ(%)
Panel A: T = 0.5
-1.0 64.53 7.19 20.07 91.79 19.63 0.44 19.94
0.00 69.96 7.25 22.79 100.00 21.19 0.65 17.99
2.00 84.38 7.36 30.19 121.93 29.11 1.08 14.21
3.13 a 95.00 7.42 35.91 138.33 34.42 1.49 12.22
5.00 106.38 7.53 45.09 159.01 42.86 2.24 9.98
Panel B: T = 4
-1.0 64.04 6.16 20.54 90.74 18.43 2.11 19.58
0.00 70.15 6.29 23.56 100.00 20.04 2.30 17.51
2.00 86.36 6.58 31.77 124.71 25.60 6.17 13.60
2.83 a 95.00 6.70 36.31 138.02 28.44 7.87 12.10
5.00 114.48 7.06 49.53 171.06 35.77 13.76 9.17
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
4.5.2 Seed capitals effects, economic values of the fund
Table 4.4 presents results of economic values of the fund and subjective values of fees with
or without seeding vehicle (shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively) for various levels
of alpha. More specifically, the economic value of the fund with seed capital is less (more)
than a fund without seed capital for a positive (negative) alpha, holding alpha fixed. This is
because the seed capital will be returned at a hurdle rate and no longer earns the premium
alpha. However, if we take the illiquidity discount into consideration, the adjusted economic
value, denoted by V ∗ = V − ID, of the fund with seed capital is always greater than that
without seed capital. Take the case alpha = 5% for example, the adjusted economic value
of the ESFs with 5% of seed capital is 156.12, compared to 154.44 for a fund without seed
capital. The main reason is that ψ percent of the ESFs manager revenue is transferred to
the outside investors via fees-for-seed swap, thus generating diversification benefits for the
fund.
One may note that the ESFs manager may be better off without any seeding investments.
This is true only when the ESFs manager can reach the target AUM level for a successful
launch. If it is hard for the manager to achieve the target, she may turn to the seeder and give
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up some fraction of her fees revenue due to lack of bargaining power. For example, Panel B
of Table 4.4 illustrates that the manager should give up 12.08% of her fees in exchange of 5%
of AUM from the seeder.
For an unskilled ESFs manager, α = 0, both Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show that the eco-
nomic value of the fund equals to the initial investment S0 = 100, which means the ordinary
investor bears the loss to pay fees to the manager. As alpha increases, both the economic
value of the fund and the ordinary investors’ payoffs grow as we expected.
TABLE 4.4: The table presents valuations of different agents’ claims with non-spanned risk for vari-
ous levels of alpha. Panel A and B report the results for the case with Φ = 0 and Φ = 5%, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ (%)
Panel A: the seed capital ratio Φ = 0
-1.0 65.28 0.00 25.90 91.18 22.46 3.45 0.00
0.00 71.16 0.00 28.84 100.00 24.72 4.11 0.00
2.00 86.76 0.00 36.80 123.56 30.70 6.10 0.00
3.29 a 100.00 0.00 43.95 143.95 35.88 8.08 0.00
5.00 112.09 0.00 53.36 165.45 42.37 10.99 0.00
Panel B: the seed capital ratio Φ = 5%
-1.0 64.27 6.53 20.51 91.31 19.08 1.43 19.60
0.00 70.00 6.63 23.37 100.00 20.45 1.60 17.62
2.00 85.17 6.85 31.14 123.15 27.38 3.76 13.84
3.00 a 95.00 6.96 36.39 138.35 31.34 5.05 12.08
5.00 109.73 7.19 47.25 164.16 39.21 8.04 9.57
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
4.5.3 Idiosyncratic risk effect, risk aversion and fees
It is obvious that the (subjective) value for the ESFs manager is generally an increasing func-
tion of AUM and time t. Unlike the risk-neutral case, in the case of risk aversion the sub-
jective values are concave functions of AUM. This is mainly because of the nonlinear terms
in our pricing PDE (4.41). As shown in Figure 4.3, the more risk-averse the manager is, the
greater the illiquidity discount the manager has to bear. More specifically, the illiquidity dis-
count is very small when AUM stays at a very low level (e.g. below 40), while it increases
quickly and reaches its peak at 33 (for the case γ = 4) as AUM increase to 200. Moreover, the
right hand subfigure in Figure 4.3 indicates that the gap of the illiquidity discount between
the case γ = 4 and the case γ = 2 converges to zero as t is approaching the end of the lock-up
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FIGURE 4.3: Comparative statics for management compensation with respect
to AUM and time t for various levels of risk aversion.
period T . Once the lock-up period expires, the ESFs manager is out of the seeding business
and bears no idiosyncratic risk any more.
FIGURE 4.4: Comparative statics for management compensation with respect
to correlation coefficients ρ.
4.5. Seeding Investments with Lock-up Period, Subjective Value of Fees, and Idiosyncratic
Risk
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Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the effect of the correlation coefficient ρ between the market
and the fund on the subjective value of the management compensation. Interestingly, the
management compensation is a not a monotonous function. It first increases with ρ to its
maximum point and then decreases afterward. On the one hand, managerial skills alpha
drops (α = µ−r−ρση)) as ρ increases, which causes a negative effect on the subjective value
G. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk decreases as ρ increases (keeping total fund
volatility σ unchanged), which is a positive effect on management compensation. Therefore,
the ESFs manager faces a trade off between the correlation coefficient and idiosyncratic risk.
Particularly, management compensation is an increasing function as the positive effect of the
idiosyncratic risk dominates the negative effect of diminishing alpha for ρ less than around
20 %. As ρ continues to increase, the negative effect dominates, and the function turns into
a decreasing function.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this article, we developed a dynamic valuation model for the hedge fund seeding busi-
ness by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem of a risk-averse manager who
launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. As traditional approaches to attract the
initial AUM and covering of organizational expenses becomes much harder for ESFs man-
agers in a much tighter financial landscape, nowadays more and more ESFs managers are
likely to turn to seed investors for early stages of capital by offering a certain proportion of
their fees through a seeding vehicle. The new swap specifies that a seeder commonly com-
mits to providing a remarkable amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an “anchor
investor” in a new fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually
a proportion of the fees that the ESFs manager generates from the entire pool of assets in
the fund. Our results indicate that the new swap not only solves the serious problems of
widespread financing constraints for ESFs managers, but can also be highly beneficial to
both the manager and the seeder if structured properly.
Moreover, we derived a closed-form solution for the fees-for-seed ratio, i.e. the seed cost,
as well as the manager’s value attached to the hedge fund seeding business. In addition we
presented a detailed numerical analysis in which we discussed sensitivity effects of various
model parameters such as the risk aversion coefficient as well as the skills factor α on our
results. Our analysis showed that, as we would expect, the greater the seed capital obtained,
the more fees the manager should give up. The fees-for-seed ratio is a linear increasing func-
tion of the amount of the seed capital. However, more interestingly, unlike an uninformed
“rule of thumb”, the slope term in this linear relationship depends on factors such as fund
volatility and managerial skills. Therefore, the closed-form solution of the seed costs in our
model is much more informed and can be regarded as a theoretical guide to the design of a
seeding vehicle contract.
Our model assumes the ESFs manager is risk averse towards the hedge fund seeding
business, thus she suffers the illiquidity discount for her valuation due to unspanned id-
iosyncratic risk. Once the ESFs is out of the seeding stage and enters into normal stage, the
manager bears no idiosyncratic risk. We found that the more risk-averse the manager is,
the greater the illiquidity discount the manager has to bear, thus the lower her subjective
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value is. In addition, the manager bears more idiosyncratic risk for longer duration of the
lock-up period, i.e. the hedge fund seeding stage. Given fixed expected return and volatil-
ity of the fund, the ESFs manager faces a trade off between the correlation coefficient and
idiosyncratic risk. As the correlation coefficient increases, the positive effect of decreasing
idiosyncratic risk at first dominates the negative effect of diminishing alpha for low level of
ρ, but then is dominated by the negative effect of diminishing alpha.
More importantly, the ordinary investors are more willing to invest in an ESFs backed
up by seeders via a fees-for-seed swap. As our numerical results illustrate, the more seed
capital the fund gets the smaller breakeven alphas the ordinary investors demand for their
investment. Therefore, the seeding vehicle helps the ESFs attract more investors and get
sufficient capital for a successful launch. Moreover, our results show that the adjusted eco-
nomic value, denoted by V ∗ = V − ID, for a fund with seed capital is always greater than
that without any seed capitals due to ψ percent of the ESFs manager revenue is transferred
to the outside investors via fees-for-seed swaps.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion & Further Research
The fact that markets are generally incomplete and with frictions (e.g. borrowing constraints
and lack of diversification, ect.) is often neglected. Having built dynamic incomplete-market
models, this thesis provides deep insights of what role does financing innovation play in
alleviating severe financing constraints and driving economic growth. More specifically, I
have developed a number of analytically tractable models (e.g. consumption-based CAPM,
CCAPM henceforth) and identified key effects of market incompleteness on the timing of
investment both in entrepreneurial finance and hedge funds management. In the following
text, I will first outline the main contribution of this research and then I will provide details
of further research which mainly based on this thesis.
5.1 Conclusion
Chapter 2 improves a generalized model of capital structure for SMEs with equity-for-
guarantee swaps trade-off among borrowing constraints, tax, diversification benefits, and
costs of financial distress. Our model predicts that these innovative swaps fundamentally
raises the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity and therefore the entrepreneur optimally is-
sues more debt and takes higher leverage than that without the equity-for-guarantee swap.
Our numerical results show that: (1) the entrepreneur with the swap receives more wel-
fare increments and has more investment opportunities because of being more willing to
invest; (2) higher leverage leads to larger tax shields and diversification benefits because the
entrepreneur faces less equity exposure to the project and thus her portfolio (consisting of
private equity and her liquid wealth) is less risky; (3) higher risk-averse entrepreneurs under
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higher nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk gain more benefits resulting from the equity-for-
guarantee swap.
Chapter 3 deals with the pricing of seed costs and the risk shifting behavior of an ESFs
manager who signs new three party agreements, here called the fees-for-guarantee swap
and the fees-for-seed swap, with a seeder and an insurer. An insurer was firstly introduced
in Chapter 3, through fees-for-guarantee swaps, to solve the problem of information asym-
metry by enhancing the ESFs manager’s credibility. These innovative swaps effectively align
the interests of the seeder with those of the ESFs manager. Moreover, quantitative results re-
veal the nonlinear relationship between the fees-for-seed ration and managerial stake, which
is different from the ”thumb rule” in practice except the case when ESFs managers face no
endogenous liquidation risks.
Chapter 4 has developed a dynamic tractable framework based on the ESFs manager’s
portfolio choice problem to capture important factors in the hedge fund seeding business
such as illiquidity, risk attitude, managerial skill (alpha) and compensation. Numerical re-
sults illustrate that: (1) the risk averse ESFs manager suffers the illiquidity discount for her
valuation due to unspanned idiosyncratic risk; (2) the ordinary investors are more willing to
invest in an ESFs backed up by seeders via a fees-for-seed swap; (3) the more seed capital the
fund gets the smaller breakeven alphas the ordinary investors demand for their investment,
which means the seeding vehicle helps the ESFs attract more investors and get sufficient
capital for a successful launch.
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5.2 Further research
Having been built on the foundation of thesis, my plans for further research will continue us-
ing the above CCAPM approach to study the effects of financing innovation on managerial
compensation, investment allocation and risk management under incomplete information
framework. In this section, I will conduct further research in the following three aspects:
(1) Hedge funds seeding innovation under incomplete information
According to Grossman (September 29,2005), an investment in a hedge fund is really an
investment in a manager and the specialized talent he possesses to capture profits from a
unique strategy. Therefore, it is vital for both investors and managers to correctly assess the
manager’s skill, alpha, from a quantitative perspective, see in Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013).
Unlike Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) who assume the managerial skill, alpha, is observable
constant variable, I develop a model under incomplete information setting featuring the
uncertainty of alpha that is unobservable for both investors and the manager. Therefore,
correctly updating beliefs via learning of the fund’s alpha based on the history information
of the fund is essential for agents to price contingent claims. In the spirit of Goetzmann,
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013), we extend their models into
the hedge fund seeding business in an incomplete market, which facilitates quantitative
analysis of dynamic learning, hedge fund seeding costs, management compensation, and
dynamic investment strategies in a partially observable economy. Similar Dothan and Feld-
man (1986), Detemple (1986), and Gennotte (1986) among others, we have established a par-
ticular partial information setup by simply declaring the alpha unobservable, meanwhile
offering a pivotal deviation from a complete information setting.
(2) Entrepreneurial finance with asymmetric information
Both Yang and Zhang (2013) and Wang, Yang, and Zhang (2015b) have shown the merits
of the swap, one might ask why equity-for-guarantee swaps have not gained widespread
acceptance. One possible answer is that, due to asymmetric information among three par-
ties: i.e. the entrepreneur, the bank, and the insurer, the swap might involve significant risks
in terms of both moral hazard and adverse selection. To shed more light on this, I would
continue using the partial information framework to build a dynamic model that captures
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asymmetric information and its effect on entrepreneurs’ consumption and investment deci-
sions.
(3) Optimal long term financial contracting
Current research in this area feature learning as uncertainty arises if the project quality or
agent ability is unobservable, see He et al. (forthcoming) and Prat and Jovanovic (2014)
among others. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) presents a theory of a firms investment dy-
namics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. As
stated in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) that“Firms and investors seek contractual ways to
mitigate these problem”, I plan to extend DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)’s model to analyze
the effects of innovative financial contracts (e.g. equity-for-guarantee swaps and fees-for-
seed swaps) on firms investment and its role of mitigating agency conflicts This future work
will help to explain the popularity of high-water-mark used in hedge funds as benchmarks
for profit sharing.
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Appendix A
Equilibrium Valuation and Proof of
Theorem 2.3.1
A.1 Equilibrium Valuation of Corporate Securities
In the previous text the entrepreneur’s subjective value G(y) of equity owned by the en-
trepreneur is obtained by solving numerically the nonlinear ODE (2.24) with two free bound-
aries yd and yu, which is derived from a utility maximization problem. Except for G(y),
other corporate securities summarized below are valued by equilibrium valuation approach
which provides market values since these securities are held by diversified investors.
Generally speaking, to determine equilibrium valuation, one needs to fix a martingale
pricing operator (Ingersoll (2006)), or a state-price deflator (Duffie (2001)). There are infinite
state-price deflators in an incomplete market. To fix a deflator one can solve a single-agent
optimization problem and take the marginal utility of the agent as the special state-price
deflator (Duffie (2001)). This deflator is the equilibrium martingale pricing operator used in
Ingersoll (2006), Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and essentially also in Merton (1976)
if the agent selected is the representative agent.
With regard to the problem discussed here, the specially chosen state-price deflator pi
satisfies dpi = −rpidt − ηpidZ, pi0 = 1. The risk-neutral probability measure Q is equivalent
to P with the restrictions to Ft for any t ≥ 0. Restricted to (Ω,Ft), we have λt = dQdP and
λt = exp(rt)
pit
pi0
, see Duffie (2001).
Denote by ρ the correlation coefficient between the project and the market portfolio, by
ν ≡ µy − ρση the risk-adjusted drift rate of the project, and BQt a standard Brownian motion
satisfying dBQt = dBt + ηdt. Then under Q, the dynamics of the revenue in (2.2) can be
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rewritten as
dyt = νytdt+ ρσytdB
Q
t + ytdZt, y0 given. (A.1)
According to the dynamic asset pricing theory (Duffie (2001)), one can derive the follow-
ing equilibrium price (value)
V f (y) = EQ
[∫ ∞
t
exp (−r(s− t)) f(ys)ds |yt = y
]
(A.2)
for any time-independent claim underlying the revenue y of the project with a payment
flow f(yt) to the claimant. If f(·) is a linear function, V f (y) can be determined by solving
the integral directly. Alternatively, the function V f (y) satisfies the following ODE from Ito’s
formula:
νyV fy (y) +
1
2
σ2y2V fyy(y) + f(x)− rV f (y) = 0. (A.3)
One can identify the solution of function V f (y) by specifying the general solution of the
homogeneous ODE with boundary conditions.
Firstly, the unlevered public firm value A(y) is immediately given by
A(y) = EQ
[∫ ∞
t
exp (−r(s− t)) (1− τm)ysds |yt = y
]
= (1− τm) y
r − ν . (A.4)
Secondly, the two real roots, denoted by θ1 and θ2, of the quadratic equation 12σ
2θ(θ −
1) + νθ − r = 0 are given by
θ1,2 =
−(ν − σ2/2)∓√(ν − σ2/2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
, (A.5)
where obviously θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 1.
Define stopping time τd = inf{t ≥ 0 : yt ≤ yd} which is the first passage time when the
stochastic cash flow hits the bankruptcy threshold yd. Denote by q˜d(y) a security that claims
one unit of account at the default time without cash-out option, then we have
q˜d(y) = EQ[e−r(τd−t)|yt = y] =
(
y
yd
)θ1
. (A.6)
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Thus, the equilibrium value of equity of a levered public firm is given by
E(y) = EQ
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)(1− τm)(ys − b)ds |yt = y
]
= (1− τm)
(
y
r − ν −
b
r
)
− (1− τm)
(
yd
r − ν −
b
r
)
q˜d(y). (A.7)
Naturally, the market value of the outside equity of an entrepreneurial firm without cash-out
option is given by
E0(y; yd) = (1− τe)
(
y
r − ν −
b
r
)
− (1− τe)
(
yd
r − ν −
b
r
)
q˜d(y). (A.8)
The endogenously determined default threshold of levered public firm, denoted by ypd,
solves a maximum-equity-valuation problem, which is given by (see Chapter 11 of Duffie
(2001))
ypd =
θ1
θ1 − 1
(r − ν)b
r
. (A.9)
Prior to default, the creditors receive continuous coupon payment b, and after default
has taken place, they are entitled to the unlevered value of the firm deducting bankruptcy
cost. Thus the value, denoted by D(y), of the debt of the public firm is given by
D(y) = EQ
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)bds+
∫ ∞
τd
e−r(s−t)α(1− τm)ysds |yt = y
]
=
b
r
(
1−
(
y
yd
)θ1)
+ αA(yd)
(
y
yd
)θ1
. (A.10)
Therefore, the sum of E(y) in (A.7) and D(y) in (A.10) gives the total firm value as:
V (y) = A(y) +
τmb
r
(
1−
(
y
yd
)θ1)
− κA(yd)
(
y
yd
)θ1
, (A.11)
where the first termA(y) is the unlevered firm value in (A.4), the second term is the expected
present value of tax shields and the last term is the expected present value of bankruptcy
costs.
The optimal coupon b∗ is the solution of maximizing the total firm value over all ad-
missible parameter values b∗ = arg max
b
V (y). Then, the public firm value with the optimal
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coupon is (Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010)):
V ∗(y) =
[
1− τm + τm
(
1− θ1 − κ(1− τm)θ1
τm
)1/θ1] y
r − ν , (A.12)
which is just the value of the firm when the entrepreneur exercises cash-out option.
Thirdly, the market value F (y) of outside debt and the market value E0(y; yd, yu) of eq-
uity of the entrepreneurial firm with cash-out option are derived by equilibrium valuation
as well. They depend on q˜(y) (resp. q¯(y)) which is the market value of a security that claims
one unit of account at the default time before cash-out (resp. when cash-out occurs before
default).
For a given domain D ≡ (yd, yu), we define a stopping time τD = inf{t ≥ 0 : yt /∈ D},
which is the time of the first departure of yt from the domain D. At the stopping time, when
default occurs before cash-out (resp. cash-out occurs before default), the security q˜(y) (resp.
q¯(y)) claims one unit, which define the boundary conditions of the pricing equation (A.3) as
follows.
q˜(yd) = 1; q˜(yu) = 0; q¯(yd) = 0; q¯(yu) = 1 (A.13)
By a standard approach, the market values of q˜(y) and q¯(y) are given by
q˜(y) =
yθ2yu
θ1 − yθ1yuθ2
yuθ1ydθ2 − yuθ2ydθ1 , (A.14)
and
q¯(y) =
yθ1yd
θ2 − yθ2ydθ1
yuθ1ydθ2 − yuθ2ydθ1 . (A.15)
At the default trigger yd, debt was guaranteed with level φ, in that F (yd) = φ br , and the
shareholder gets nothing, i.e. E0(yd) = 0. At the cash-out trigger yu, debt is retired and
recovers its initial value F0, in that F (yu) = F0, and the equity value E0(yu) = V ∗(yu). Thus
solving the pricing equation (A.3) with boundary conditions defined above gives
F (y) =
b
r
+
(
F0 − b
r
)
q¯(y) + (φ− 1) b
r
q˜(y), (A.16)
A.2. Proof hint of Theorem 2.3.1 97
and
E0(y; yd, yu) = (1− τe)
(
y
r−ν − br
)
− (1− τe)
(
yd
r−ν − br
)
q˜(y)
+
[
V ∗(yu)− (1− τe)
(
yd
r−ν − br
)]
q¯(y).
(A.17)
Therefore the initial outside debt is given by solving the equation F0 = F (y0), which gives
F0 =
b
r
+ (φ− 1) b
r
q˜(y0)
1− q¯(y0) . (A.18)
The prediction of default is characterized by the cumulative probability of the firm going
bankrupt over the period (0, T ), which is equivalent to the probability that the cash flow
process yt hits the default boundary yd from above given the constant level y0 within T .
This is calculated as (see, e.g. Leland and Toft (1996))
Pyd,T = Prob(Td < T ) = N(
xd − µˆT
σ
√
T
) + exp(
2µˆxd
σ2
)N(
xd + µˆT
σ
√
T
), (A.19)
where xd = log(
yd
y0
), µˆ = µy − σ2/2, and N(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. Similarly, the cash-out probability is
Pyu,T = Prob(Tu < T ) = N(
−xu + µˆT
σ
√
T
) + exp(
2µˆxu
σ2
)N(
−xu − µˆT
σ
√
T
), (A.20)
where xu = log(yuy0 ).
A.2 Proof hint of Theorem 2.3.1
The proof here is quite similar to that of Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010). After exit (via
cash-out or default), the entrepreneur solves standard complete markets market comsump-
tion/portfolio choice problem and her value function Je(w) is explicitly given by Equation
(2.9), i.e.
Je(w) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (A.21)
Before exit, the entrepreneur bears unspaned idiosyncratic risk and her value function
Js(w, y) satisfies the HJB Equation (2.16) due to the principle of optimality.
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Now we conjecture that Js(w, y) takes the following exponential form
Js(w, y) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
, (A.22)
where G(y) is the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent wealth.Under this conjectured value
function, it is easy to show that the optimal consumption rule and the portfolio rule are
given by Equations (2.22) and (2.23), respectively. Substituting these expressions back into
the HJB Equation (2.16) gives the differential Equation (2.24) for G(y).
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Appendix B
Pricing a hedge fund
In this appendix, we here provide the details of computing the equilibrium values of con-
tingent claims associated with a hedge fund.
In order to compute the equilibrium value of fees and investor claim (Equations (3.5) to
(3.7)) defined in Section (3.2.1), two boundary conditions are required. The first boundary
condition indicates that once the asset value falls to the liquidation level, S(Ht), then in-
vestors will withdraw all his money from the hedge fund and there are no further costs or
fees generated.
A(S(Ht), Ht) = 0, P (S(Ht), Ht) = 0, I(S(Ht), Ht) = S(Ht), (B.1)
whereS(Ht) = lHt.
The other condition applies along the boundary St = Ht. The HWM is reset to Ht + ε,
while the net asset value excess the HWM to Ht + ε and then the manager obtain a perfor-
mance fee of kε, reducing the asset value to Ht + ε(1− k). So, we have
P (Ht + ε,Ht)− P (Ht + ε− kε,Ht) = kε, (B.2)
In the limit, as ε → 0, and using Taylor’s expansion rule, giving the second boundary con-
dition
kPS(Ht, Ht) = k + PH(Ht, Ht), (B.3)
and boundary conditions for the regular annual fees and the investor’s claim are given by
kAS(Ht, Ht) = AH(Ht, Ht), kIS(Ht, Ht) = IH(Ht, Ht). (B.4)
100 Appendix B. Pricing a hedge fund
According to the dynamic asset pricing theory (Duffie (2001)), one can derive the follow-
ing equilibrium price
V f (St, Ht) = EQ
[∫ τ
t
exp (−r(s− t)) f(ys)ds |St = S0, Ht = H0
]
(B.5)
for any contingent claim underlying AUM (St) and HWM(Ht) with a payment flow f(St, Ht)
to the claimant. If f(·) is a linear function, V f (y) can be determined by solving the integral
directly. Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), the value function is time in-
dependent, i.e. V ft = 0. Thus, the function V
f (y) satisfies the following ODE from Ito’s
formula
(α+ r − ω −m)SV fS +
1
2
σ2S2V fSS + (g − ω −m′)HV fH + λ(f(M)− V f )− rV f = 0. (B.6)
One can identify the solution of function V f (St, Ht) by specifying the general solution
of the homogeneous ODE with boundary conditions defined in Equations (B.1), (B.3) and
(B.4).
Further, it is clear by the economics of the problem that V f is homogeneous of degree
one in S and H , so the solution has the form V f (St, Ht) = HtG(s). Substituting this and its
derivatives into Equation (B.6) gives an ODE
1
2
σ2x2Gss + (α+ r +m
′ − g −m)sGs − (r +m′ − g + ω + λ)G+ γs = 0, (B.7)
where γ = 0 for f = P , γ = m for f = A or f = F , and γ = ω + λ for f = I .
The solution to Equation (B.7) is given by
G(s) =
γs
m+ ω + λ− α +As
θ1 +Bsθ2 , (B.8)
where A and B are constants of integration and the two real roots, denoted by θ1 and θ2
solve the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2θ(θ − 1) + (α+ r +m′ −m− g)θ − (r +m′ − g + ω + λ) = 0. (B.9)
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Solving the above equation and with the no bubble conditions m+ ω + λ ≥ α easily gives
θ1,2 =
−($ − σ2/2)∓√($ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2($ +m− α+ ω + λ)
σ2
, (B.10)
where$ ≡ α+ r +m′ −m− g obviously θ1 < 1 < θ2.
Therefore the equilibrium value of the total fees, performance fee and the investor’s
claim are
F (St, Ht) =
m
m+ω+λ−αSt +
(ω+λ−α)k+[θ1(1+k)−1]ml1−θ1
(m+ω+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ2Stθ2
− lθ2−θ1 (ω+λ−α)k+[θ2(1+k)−1]ml1−θ1
(m+ω+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ1Stθ1 .
(B.11)
P (St, Ht) = k
Ht
1−θ2Stθ2 − lθ2−θ1Ht1−θ1Stθ1
θ2(1 + k)− 1− lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1 + k)− 1] . (B.12)
I(St, Ht) =
ω+λ
m+ω+λ−αSt − (ω+λ)k+[θ1(1+k)−1](m−α)l
1−θ1
(m+ω+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ2Stθ2
+ l
θ2−θ1 (ω+λ)k+[θ2(1+k)−1](m−α)l1−θ1
(m+ω+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ1Stθ1 .
(B.13)
Thus the annual fees A(St, Ht) is given by
A(St, Ht) = F (St, Ht)− P (St, Ht). (B.14)
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Appendix C
Market Value of the Hedge Fund
After the lock-up period, we assume that the fund enters into a normal stage and the man-
ager no longer bears the idiosyncratic risk, which is quite similar to the case discussed in
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003). In the normal stage, the manager is paid via both
management and performance fees. The management fee is specified as a constant fraction
m of the net asset value while the incentive fee is commonly accompanied by a high wa-
ter mark (HWM) provision. Intuitively, the HWM Ht is the running maximum of net asset
value S when g ≡ ω+c′ , i.e. Ht = max{Su;u ∈ [0, t]}. In a more general setting, for St < Ht,
the HWM Ht evolves deterministically as
dHt = (g − ω − c′)Htdt, (C.1)
where g is the contractual growth rate at which H changes (generally zero or r) and c
′
is the
cost or fees allocated to reducing the HWM.
At any time t ≥ 0, we can compute the value of the total fees F (S,H, t) and the ordinary
investors’ value I(S,H) respectively as follows:
F (S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)[mS + k(dHs − (g − ω − c′)Hsds)]ds
]
, (C.2)
I(S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ωS + e−r(s−t)Sτds
]
, (C.3)
where τ , the stochastic liquidation time, is defined as τ = min{τ1, τ2} where τ1 is the exoge-
nous liquidation time and τ2 ≡ inf{t;St/Ht = l} is the endogenous liquidation time.
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Using the same valuation approach as in subsection 4.3.1, the market values of the con-
tingent claims defined above satisfy the following ODE1
(α+ r − ω −m)SVS + 1
2
σ2S2VSS + (g − ω − c′)HVH + λV − rV + f(S, t) = 0, (C.4)
where f(S, t) represents any payment made to the claims to be valued for the two different
cases, and two boundary conditions apply as stated below.
Further, it is clear that the underlying economics of the problem implies that V (y) is
homogeneous of degree one in S and H , hence the solution has the form V (S,H) = HQ(x),
where x ≡ S/H . Substituting this expression as well as its derivatives into Equation (C.4)
gives an ODE
1
2
σ2x2Qxx + (α+ r + c
′ − g −m)xQx − (r + c′ − g + ω + λ)Q+ θx = 0, (C.5)
where θ = m for the case of management fee or total fees, and θ = ω + λ for the case of
payoffs allocated to the ordinary investors.
The solution to Equation (C.5) is given by
Q(x) =
γx
m+ ω + λ− α +Ax
ϑ1 +Bxϑ2 , (C.6)
where A and B are constants of integration and the two real roots, denoted by ϑ1 and ϑ2
solve the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2ϑ(ϑ− 1) + (α+ r + c′ −m− g)ϑ− (r + c′ − g + ω + λ) = 0. (C.7)
Solving the above equation and imposing the no bubble conditions m+ω+λ ≥ α 2leads
to:
ϑ1,2 =
−($ − σ2/2)∓√($ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2($ +m− α+ ω + λ)
σ2
, (C.8)
where$ ≡ α+ r + c′ −m− g obviously ϑ1 < 1 < ϑ2.
1Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), the values of the contingent claims are independent of
time in our setup, i.e. Vt ≡ 0
2Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) who state that, “the total withdrawals from the assets,
m + ω + λ, must exceed the superior performance, α; otherwise, the fund will have a residual value at infinity
whose present value is infinite.”
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In order to solve the ODE, two boundary conditions are required. One boundary condi-
tion is determined as the asset value falls to the liquidation barrier, x ≡ l:
i(l) ≡ I(lH,H)/H = l,
f(l) ≡ F (lH,H)/H = 0.
(C.9)
The other condition applies along the boundary x¯ ≡ 1 when the HWM is reset to H + ε,
while the net asset value exceeds the HWM at the level of H + ε and then the manager
obtains a performance fee of kε, reducing the asset value toH+ε(1−k). For ε→ 0, we have
i(1) = (k + 1)i′(1),
f(1) = (k + 1)f ′(1)− k.
(C.10)
One can identify the solution V (S,H) by specifying the general solution of the homoge-
neous ODE with the two boundary conditions defined in equations (C.9) and (C.10).
Solving the above equation and applying the no bubble conditions m + ω + λ ≥ α pro-
vides us with:
I(S,H) = ω+λm+ω+λ−αS − (ω+λ)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1](m−α)l
1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
+ l
ϑ2−ϑ1 (ω+λ)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1](m−α)l1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 ,
(C.11)
F (S,H) = mm+ω+λ−αS +
(ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
− lϑ2−ϑ1 (ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 .
(C.12)
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